Volume 8, No. 5, May 2026
Editor: Rashed Rahman
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Pakistan like the rest of the world is passing through a rupture moment. The categories of capitalism, socialism and class struggle in the terms of the age of the first industrial revolution are inadequate or misleading in understanding Pakistani reality during the age of the fourth industrial revolution. There are three possible paths available for social transformation at present: overthrowing the state, agitating to resist the excesses of capitalist power, or negotiating for a new social contract in a piecemeal way. Overthrow of the state power was the most effective path in the underdeveloped capitalist societies like Russia and China, where state power was used for primitive accumulation of capital. In advanced capitalist societies, the power of capital may be defeated in an incremental way through democratic means. Let us examine if this view makes sense in terms of Marxian tradition.
Karl Marx identified two key formulas in Capital to describe the relations of production in pre-capitalist and capitalist societies: C–M–C and M–C–M′ (Ref. 40 below). However, he did not provide an explicit formula for a future socialist or communist society. This section summarises Marx’s original framework and how later Marxists such as Lenin, Bukharin and David Harvey extended or reinterpreted these formulas.
Under socialism or communism, Marx implied that commodity exchange and use of wage labour for producing surplus value is abolished – production is for use, not for exchange (40).
| Mode of Circulation | Formula | Essence |
| Simple Commodity Circulation | C–M–C | Sell to buy → money mediates exchange for use-values |
| Capitalist Circulation | M–C–M′ | Invest to make more money → money as self-expanding value |
| Post-capitalist (implied) | P→U | Production directly for use (no commodity exchange) |
Production for use without mediation of market or price mechanisms can become an exercise based on arbitrary distribution of the value produced. There is no way of knowing the nature and magnitude of use values to be produced for meeting the needs of society except for handing over these decisions to a bureaucratic class. Even the value of a just wage cannot be determined because according to Marx the just reward for the labour contributed to the process of production is equal to ‘socially necessary labour time’. Such a calculation is almost impossible to carry out. That is why Marx and Engles confessed that they did not have a blueprint for the future socialist society. Marx also does not see the solution of capitalist exploitation as reverting to production of use values like primitive societies as idealised by Gandhi. Progress in Marx’s view is an integral part of abolishing capitalist exploitation and as important as economic justice. As a result, different Marxist thinkers and socialist societies conducted a variety of experiments for allocation and distribution of exchange values produced in the socialist societies. Some of the leading interpretations are given below.
In The State and Revolution (36) and The Economic and Political Organisation of the Socialist State (1918-1921), Lenin emphasised that the socialist phase is transitional – it still inherits forms from capitalism but begins to transform them. He did not introduce a new formula, but his idea can be summarised symbolically as: M–C–Mₛ (State-controlled circulation). Money still exists but under state control; commodities still circulate but production is organised by plan, not profit. The final term Mₛ represents state-allocated value for collective reproduction. Nikolai Bukharin, in Economics of the Transition Period (11), described socialism as a hybrid system where two logics coexist: the capitalist (M–C–M′) and the emerging socialist (P→U). He argued that the socialist state must gradually replace commodity exchange by planned distribution. By the mid-20th century, Marxist economists such as Ernest Mandel and later David Harvey viewed socialist production as organised around a circuit of use-values rather than capital accumulation (37, 38; Harvey, 22). Mandel described communism as production for use, symbolised by P→U. Harvey extended Marx’s circuits of capital to imagine a post-capitalist circulation represented as U₁→P→U₂, where production begins and ends with use-values rather than monetary exchange (22).
Comparative Table of Circulation Logics
| Mode of Production | Symbolic Formula | Key Mediating Logic | Goal |
| Pre-capitalist/Simple exchange | C–M–C | Money as medium of exchange | Use-value |
| Capitalist | M–C–M′ | Money as capital (self-expanding value) | Profit (surplus value) |
| Transitional socialist (Lenin/Bukharin) | M–C–Mₛ → P–U | State-directed money circulation | Social reproduction |
| Fully socialist/communist (Mandel/Harvey) | P→U or U₁→P→U₂ | Planning by needs, not prices | Human development, use-value |
Marx refused to codify a future formula because he saw communism not as a new circulation pattern but as the abolition of circulation as the governing social form. Later Marxists, however, attempted to represent transitional and planned economies symbolically, all converging on the shift from money and profit to need and use (Lenin 36; Bukharin 11; Mandel 38; Harvey 22). However, need-based production, mediated by the state, took different forms in different socialist (or post-capitalist) societies. This form was also used by welfare states and ‘free market’ economies. That is why state or private ownership of industry is not an appropriate indicator for determining if an economic system is capitalist or socialist.
Andrew Young aptly summed up the deceptive nature of state or market control of the productive resources by saying that the US system is “Socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor.”(Note 1 at the end) This description is also true for Pakistan. We see a very interesting and unique formula for circulation in Pakistan that depicts the fundamental contradiction that characterises relations of production in Pakistan. It is M-C-M⁻. M-C-M⁻ is best understood if we see that in Pakistan profit is not a direct appropriation of surplus value. It arises from the conversion of public loss into private profit. It is an appropriation taking place in the sphere of distribution of surplus value. Despite the apparent capitalist form, the Pakistani economy is a rent-producing economy. The instruments used for this purpose are regressive indirect taxes, misappropriation in the government’s procurement process, price distortions, use of Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) for price manipulation, restrictions on direct foreign investment, land grabbing by the state, and pushing a large part of the working class into the informal sector unserved by the state. The informal economy is largely part of the gig economy that has converted wage labour into an entrepreneurial form. At present, there is no credible evidence to support a blanket claim that Pakistani industry ‘adds negative value’ in aggregate. But there is evidence that private profits hide the public loss that has contributed to profits. This has happened due to the State’s role in tampering with market prices and transferring resources from certain sectors of the economy to other sectors.
The Role of the State in Pakistan’s Economic Development – Mercenary Capitalism?
Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s state has played a central – if inconsistent – role in economic development. During the 1950s-1970s, Pakistan pursued import substitution industrialisation (ISI), relying heavily on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-directed credit allocation. This led to some industrial growth but entrenched elite capture and inefficiencies (27). Structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s and 1990s under IMF and World Bank programmes shifted policy toward privatisation and liberalisation, but the state continued to intervene extensively through subsidies, regulation, and preferential contracts (32). This has given Pakistan’s economy the character of mercenary capitalism that aligns with the interests of global capital to extract value through the power of the state. Andrew Young’s critique of US capitalism – where the wealthy receive state support while the poor face the full force of market discipline – fits Pakistan’s experience to a significant extent. The Pakistani state routinely offers protection, bailouts, and subsidies to politically connected businesses while underfunding public welfare and education. For example, large conglomerates and banks receive preferential tax treatment and debt restructuring, whereas small enterprises face credit scarcity and regulatory burdens (18, 27). This dualism mirrors the ‘socialism for the rich’ phenomenon in developing contexts.
Pakistan’s low tax-to-GDP ratio (hovering around 9-10 percent) reflects structural weaknesses and deliberate political choices. According to the International Center for Public Policy (28), Pakistan’s tax system relies heavily on indirect taxes, which are regressive, while exemptions for elites – particularly in agriculture, real estate and industry – erode the tax base. Political elites and rent-seeking bureaucracies resist reforms that would expand direct taxation, preferring instead to extract revenues through ad hoc levies, regulatory fees, or discretionary rents. Such extractive behaviour aligns with clientelist politics, where patronage networks are sustained by informal resource flows rather than transparent taxation.
The persistence of graft in Pakistan, despite periodic anti-corruption campaigns, can be partly explained by incentive structures. Raising civil servants’ salaries to private-sector levels might theoretically reduce corruption; however, empirical evidence from Pakistan and other developing countries suggests mixed outcomes (53). Large across-the-board pay raises are often fiscally unsustainable, while corruption persists due to weak accountability, political interference, and patronage-based promotions (34). Moreover, discretionary authority in procurement and regulation provides lucrative opportunities for rent extraction, which higher salaries alone cannot offset. Transparency International Pakistan’s 2023 (51) surveys reveal that citizens perceive corruption as systemic, not merely wage-related.
To shift from extractive to developmental governance, Pakistan must prioritise institutional reforms that increase transparency, reduce discretion, and align incentives. These include simplifying tax codes, phasing out exemptions, digitising tax administration, introducing targeted performance-based pay for revenue officials, and enhancing independent oversight over procurement and public spending. Such reforms require political will and citizen engagement, as rent-seeking coalitions benefit from the status quo (53). Such systemic reform can be carried out in long term through a consultative, constitutional and transparent process based on mutual trust. Such a participatory democratic process calls for a democratic socialist form of politics. A democratic socialist society can be visualised either as a state-based or a community-based form of a solidarity economy, or a combination of the two. Pursuing any of these ideals is possible to achieve through democratic means.
Non-State Forms of Socialism: Soviets, Chinese Communes, and Yugoslav Workers’ Self-Management
Throughout the 20th century, socialist revolutions and post-revolutionary regimes sought to replace capitalist relations of production with collective or state-based ownership. Within this context, several experiments aimed to transcend the state itself, envisioning forms of socialism where workers directly controlled governance and production. The Soviets established during the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the People’s Communes of Maoist China, and the system of workers’ self-management in Yugoslavia tried to establish democratic forms of socialism based on community solidarity.
The Soviets (Russia)
The Soviets – workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ councils – emerged spontaneously during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 as grassroots organisations of labour and local governance (48). Initially, they represented a genuine attempt to realize Marx’s vision of direct proletarian rule, replacing the bourgeois state with local, democratic organs of administration (36). Lenin celebrated them as the “embryo of proletarian power”, seeing in them the foundation of a stateless social order. However, the early vitality of the Soviets was soon undermined by the political and economic pressures facing the new regime. Civil war, economic breakdown and foreign intervention compelled the Bolsheviks to concentrate authority in the party apparatus (19). The centralised control required for survival during “War Communism” (1918-1921) subverted the Soviets’ autonomy, transforming them into instruments of state power and rendering the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of one party.
The People’s Communes (China, 1958-1982)
The Chinese People’s Communes, launched during Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), represented an ambitious experiment in rural collectivisation and direct socialist governance (41). The communes sought to combine agriculture, industry, education and the militia into self-sufficient, egalitarian units. Mao envisioned them as steps toward communism, abolishing distinctions between manual and intellectual labour, individual and collective life, and even between local governance and the state. In theory, the communes embodied non-state socialism, aiming to bypass bureaucratic centralisation in favour of mass mobilisation (17). Yet in practice, they became sites of coercion and inefficiency. Unrealistic grain production targets and over-reporting during the Great Leap Forward contributed to a catastrophic famine (14). The centralisation of decision-making within the Communist Party nullified local autonomy.
Workers’ Self-Management (Yugoslavia, Post-1948)
After breaking with Stalin in 1948, Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia embarked on a distinctive path of socialist development, introducing a system of workers’ self-management. Under this model, factories were managed by workers’ councils that decided on production, investment, and distribution of profits, while the state acted primarily as a coordinator (25). This marked a radical departure from Soviet central planning and an attempt to construct socialism “with a human face”, grounded in worker participation.This model reflected both ideological and pragmatic motives. It expressed Yugoslavia’s rejection of Stalinist bureaucratism and sought to encourage initiative, efficiency, and participation. Initially, it produced modest successes, with growth and innovation in certain sectors (52). However, over time, the decentralisation of economic power deepened regional inequalities, as wealthier republics such as Slovenia and Croatia outpaced poorer ones like Kosovo (44).
Comparative Analysis
Although the Soviets, Chinese Communes and Yugoslav workers’ councils emerged in different cultural and historical contexts, they shared a core ideological ambition: to transcend the state as a coercive apparatus and establish collective, democratic control over production. Each represented an attempt to operationalise Marx’s claim that the state, as an instrument of class domination, would “wither away” in the higher phase of socialism (39). However, the tension between local autonomy and national coordination proved insurmountable. In Russia, war and isolation led to authoritarian centralisation; in China, ideological zeal coupled with poor planning produced economic catastrophe; and in Yugoslavia, decentralisation fostered inequality and fragmentation. These trajectories reveal that non-state socialism, while theoretically compelling, often faces structural contradictions when implemented within nation-state frameworks and global capitalist pressure.
Integrated Economic Context for Solidarity Economy in Pakistan
The informal economy in Pakistan is vast – estimated at approximately $ 457 billion, or around 35-40 percent of GDP. According to the ILO-SMEDA study, roughly 72.5 percent of the non-agricultural labour force is employed in the informal sector. The gig economy, a subset of informal employment, remains largely unquantified in Pakistan’s statistics but includes digital freelancers, ride-hailing drivers, and platform-based workers. Both the state and market have limited effectiveness in unleashing the potential of the poor. Civil society and its strategy of self-selection has emerged as the most important factor in fighting economic and social inequalities.
As per the Labour Force Survey (2020-21), total employment stood at approximately 67.2 million persons. Of these, about 37.5 percent are employed in agriculture (~25.2 million), 14.9 percent in manufacturing (~10 million), 14.4 percent in wholesale and retail trade (~9.7 million), 9.5 percent in construction (~6.4 million), and over 16 percent in community, social, and personal services (~10.8 million). Wage labour is particularly concentrated in the industrial and services sectors, while agriculture still relies heavily on family and self-employment.
As of FY 2023-24, Pakistan’s GDP was distributed approximately as follows: agriculture 23.3 percent, industry 20.7 percent, and services 56-58 percent. The services sector continues to dominate GDP, driven by trade, transport, finance, and communications. Industrial growth has been erratic, with manufacturing volatility reflecting energy shortages, import constraints, and policy uncertainty.
Remittances remain a critical stabiliser of Pakistan’s external accounts. In FY 2024-25, workers’ remittances reached an all-time high of $ 38.3 billion. In FY 2023-24, inflows were about $ 30.3 billion. The real estate sector directly contributes 2-3 percent of GDP, though when allied industries (cement, construction, materials) are included, its indirect contribution can exceed nine percent. However, this growth is often speculative rather than productive, driven by land appreciation rather than real output expansion.
Selected Data Table (Summary)
| Sector/Indicator | Estimate | Source |
| Informal Economy Size | $ 457 billion (~35-40 percent of GDP) | Pakistan Observer, 2024 |
| Informal Employment Share | 72.5 percent of non-agricultural labour | SMEDA–ILO Study |
| Agriculture Employment | 37.5 percent (~25.2 million) | PBS Labour Force Survey 2020-21 |
| Manufacturing Employment | 14.9 percent (~10 million) | PBS Labour Force Survey 2020-21 |
| Services Sector Share of GDP | ~57% | Finance Division, 2024 |
| Remittances (FY 2024-25) | $ 38.3 billion | Daily Pakistan, 2025 |
| Real Estate GDP Share | 2-3 percent (direct), up to 9 percent (indirect) | Dawn, 2022 |
Overall, the data depicts a structurally imbalanced economy with excessive reliance on informal work, remittances and real estate, coupled with weak industrial productivity.
Historical Context
At the time of independence, Pakistan inherited the administrative apparatus of British India, which was relatively well-structured in certain regions but limited in scope and depth overall. ‘Line departments’ refers to the sectoral government departments responsible for executing state functions such as health, education, irrigation, agriculture, and public works.The colonial administration in British India was highly centralised and extractive rather than developmental. Administrative reach was strongest in Punjab, Sindh’s irrigated zones and urban centres, while Balochistan, the tribal areas, and much of the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) were only nominally administered. Line departments largely served to maintain law and order, collect land revenue, and sustain canal irrigation.
| Sector | Situation in 1947 | Coverage/Reach |
| Health | Very limited; mostly urban hospitals and dispensaries. | Less than 10 percent of population had access to modern medical services. |
| Education | Sparse rural schooling; very few higher education institutions (only a couple of universities). | Literacy rates low: ~16 percent for men and ~5 percent for women in the territory at independence. |
| Agriculture & Irrigation | Well-developed canal system in Punjab and Sindh; institutional support limited to canal administration and revenue collection. | Strong administrative apparatus in irrigated zones; weak elsewhere. |
| Public Works & Communication | Railways and main roads functional for strategic and commercial needs; local infrastructure largely neglected. | Infrastructure concentrated along main routes and urban nodes. |
| Local Government | Some municipal committees in towns, weak rural administration. | Patchy presence, dependent on colonial priorities and local elites. |
Over the decades, Pakistan expanded its bureaucratic and institutional footprint significantly, although this expansion has been uneven across regions and sectors. Each province now has a full complement of line departments – Health, Education, Agriculture, Irrigation, Livestock, Social Welfare, Women Development and others – with district-level offices and usually tehsil/union council presence. Local Government Acts and administrative reforms have formally devolved certain responsibilities to sub-provincial levels.
| Sector | Present Outreach | Coverage/Reach (approx.) |
| Health | Primary Health Care Units (Basic Health Units, Rural Health Centres), district hospitals, provincial tertiary hospitals. | Approximately 80-85 percent of population live within 5-10 km of a public health facility; quality and staffing vary widely (Government of Pakistan, 2024). |
| Education | Public primary and secondary schools in most village clusters; large private schooling sector in urban areas. | Primary school access estimated near 90-95 percent; literacy improved to roughly 63 percent overall, with gender and regional gaps. |
| Agriculture & Irrigation | Departments with research, extension services, and canal management; agricultural universities and extension networks. | Covers nearly all irrigated areas and many major rain-fed districts; institutional support present though variable. |
| Social Welfare & Poverty Alleviation | Programmes such as Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) and Ehsaas, integrated with NADRA for targeting. | National-level coverage of targeted transfers and registries, though inclusion/exclusion errors persist. |
| Local Government & Municipal Services | Municipal administrations in cities; district administrations and rural local bodies where active. | Administrative outreach present in most districts; functional capacity and fiscal autonomy remain limited. |
Contemporary indicators highlight a much larger state apparatus compared to 1947: there are over 130 districts, a multi-pronged network of health and education facilities, national social protection programmes using digital registries, and an expanded civil service complement. Digital identification (NADRA) and national surveys have also increased the state’s administrative reach into households for service delivery and targeting (43, 20).
Comparison: 1947 vs Present
| Dimension | 1947 | 2025 (Approx.) |
| Administrative Units | Fewer than ~30 districts; centralised colonial administrative zones. | About 130+ districts with district-level departmental presence. |
| Health facilities | Very limited – primarily urban hospitals and dispensaries (under 1,000 facilities). | Over 14,000 public health facilities (BHUs, RHCs, hospitals) across provinces (approx.). |
| Public schools | Relatively few primary and secondary schools (roughly ~10,000 schools across the new state). | Over 260,000 public and private schools combined (approx.), with near‑universal primary‑school access in many regions. |
| Literacy rate | Low: overall ~11 percent (circa independence). | Improved substantially: roughly ~63 percent overall (with gender and regional disparities). |
| Development focus | Primarily extractive/administrative functions (revenue, irrigation control, law & order). | Greater emphasis on service delivery, social protection, and development programming (though uneven). |
| Coverage | Concentrated in urban and irrigated regions; large rural and tribal areas with limited state presence. | National coverage on paper; functional capacity and quality vary widely between urban/rural and across provinces. |
Persistent Challenges
Despite expanded administrative outreach, Pakistan’s line departments face enduring structural challenges:
– Bureaucratic centralisation and political interference that undermine consistent service delivery.
– Weak inter-departmental coordination across provinces and at district levels.
– Resource constraints, fiscal transfers, and limited local fiscal autonomy.
– Regional inequality in service quality (urban-rural and inter-provincial disparities).
-Social. Administrative and Political Infrastructure effectively serves the elite, and masses are left at the mercy of the gig economy and informal sector. Class struggle in Pakistan has taken the form of struggle between the state and disenfranchised citizens. This conflict has defined various forms of class struggle in Pakistan.
Class struggle in Pakistan manifests itself in multiple forms across rural, urban and regional contexts. These struggles range from overt confrontation over resources and political autonomy to subtler forms of asserting agency, identity and belonging. Drawing on Akhter Hameed Khan’s work on rural cooperatives and the Orangi Pilot Project, Arif Hasan’s analysis of urban informal settlements, and the recent book Silent Revolution in Pakistan: From Othering to Belonging, present an expanded typology of class struggle. It also incorporates historical movements such as the mass mobilisations of the 1960s-70s, the separatist movement in East Pakistan, and the insurrection in Balochistan as expressions of class-based grievances within broader political and ethnic frameworks.
Typology of Class Struggle
| Form of Struggle | Actors/Class Positions | Mechanisms/Strategies | Empirical Case | Outcomes/Notes |
| Rural-Urban Migration | Land-poor peasants, rural labourers, youth | Migration to cities, remittances, urban labour participation | Karachi informal settlements, 1980s-present (Hasan, 1999) | Migrants gain leverage and mobility but face precarious work and housing |
| Squatting/Informal Settlements | Urban poor, migrants, slum dwellers | Occupy land, self-construct housing, negotiate with authorities | Orangi Town sanitation and housing project, Karachi, 1980s-2000s (Khan, 1980s-1990s) | Improved services and collective agency; tenure insecurity remains |
| Microcredit/Self-help/Cooperatives | Rural villagers, women, low-income urban households | Savings circles, microloans, cooperative management | Comilla Model, 1960s-70s; Orangi Pilot Project microcredit, 1980s-2000s | Enhanced economic agency, skill development, partial empowerment |
| Civil Society/Law/Policy Advocacy | NGOs, marginalised communities, legal activists | Public interest litigation, advocacy, participatory governance | URC Karachi, community advocacy on housing rights, 1990s-present | Incremental legal recognition; limited structural change |
| Social Enterprise/Economic Innovation | Entrepreneurs from marginalised groups | Community-based enterprises, local service provision | Women-led social enterprises providing health/education in Karachi, 2010s-present | Empowerment and income generation; scalability varies |
| Cultural/Identity/Belonging | Ethnic minorities, migrants, marginalised castes, women | Assertion of identity, participation in local decision-making, and awareness campaigns | Community forums, Silent Revolution | Enhanced social inclusion and recognition; structural inequalities persist |
| Mass Movements and Political Mobilisations | Industrial workers, students, urban middle classes, peasants | Strikes, demonstrations, populist mobilisation, political organisation | 1968-69 mass movement against Ayub Khan’s regime; labour uprisings in Karachi and Punjab | Expressed deep urban-rural inequalities and state-capital tension; led to temporary democratisation |
| Separatist Movement in East Pakistan | Bengali working and middle classes, peasantry | Political mobilisation, cultural assertion, armed struggle | East Pakistan (1952-1971) | Rooted in class and regional disparities; culmination in Bangladesh’s independence |
| Insurrection in Balochistan | Tribal middle classes, students, resource-poor populations | Guerrilla warfare, resource rights demands, autonomy movements | Balochistan conflicts (1973-77; 2002-present) | Highlights peripheral underdevelopment and centre-periphery class tensions |
Analysis of Constraints and Limitations
Despite these forms of class struggle, structural inequalities in land ownership, capital accumulation, and political influence persist. While localised and developmental struggles (e.g., cooperatives, informal housing) have enhanced agency, broader political movements reveal the systemic nature of class conflict embedded in the state’s uneven development. Mass movements and regional insurrections expose how class antagonisms intersect with ethnicity, regional deprivation, and political exclusion. However, many such struggles are either repressed or co-opted by state and elite actors, transforming potential class revolutions into negotiated settlements or autonomy movements.
Conclusion
Class struggle in Pakistan encompasses visible, structural, and identity-based forms of resistance. From rural migration and urban squatting to microcredit initiatives, legal advocacy, mass mobilisation and separatist movements, Pakistan’s political economy is deeply shaped by conflicts over resources, representation, and belonging. The empirical typology demonstrates that while developmental and civil society initiatives improve local conditions, deeper transformations require addressing structural inequalities that have historically fuelled mass movements and regional insurgencies. We need to briefly review the success and failure of various form of class struggle in Pakistan and democratic socialist politics in other countries to visualise the path of democratic socialist politics in Pakistan.
Trade Union Movement’s Rise and Decline
The trade union movement in Pakistan began with a strong foundation. In the 1950s and 1960s, trade unions played a significant role in shaping the country’s labour landscape (4). The 1960s are often referred to as the ‘Golden Age’ of Pakistan’s labour movement, with significant industrial development and worker mobilisation. However, the movement’s strength began to wane in the late 1970s and 1980s due to neoliberal policies, military rule, and fragmentation (31).
Women’s Movement
Women have played a vital role in Pakistan’s labour movement, particularly in the informal sector, such as cotton picking. Women’s movements, such as the Aurat March, have highlighted issues like labour rights, gender equality, and violence against women (33).
Insurrections in Balochistan
Balochistan has witnessed several insurgencies, driven by demands for greater autonomy, resource control, and social justice (2). These movements often intersect with class struggle, as Baloch people seek to address economic and social disparities (8).
Mass Movements Against Dictatorship
Pakistan has a history of mass movements against authoritarian regimes, including the 1968-69 movement that led to the end of Ayub Khan’s rule (30). Workers’ role in these struggles is significant, often allying with other pro-democracy forces.
Separation of East Pakistan
The Bangladesh Liberation War was a culmination of the nationalist movement in East Pakistan, driven by demands for greater autonomy and economic justice (45). The war was also a manifestation of class struggle, as the Bengali population sought to address economic and social disparities (12).
Democratic Paths to Socialism: Comparative Global Analysis
We can compare the successes and failures of democratic paths to socialism in West Bengal, Kerala, Chile, Indonesia, and Uruguay. Each case demonstrates distinct interactions between class mobilisation, democratic participation and state structure, revealing how contextual factors and political strategies influenced the endurance or collapse of socialist projects.
West Bengal
In West Bengal, the Left Front government led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) pursued land reform and decentralisation, notably through Operation Barga, which strengthened tenant rights and expanded rural participation in governance. These initiatives initially produced considerable legitimacy among peasants and working-class populations. However, industrial stagnation, the mishandling of land acquisition conflicts in Nandigram and Singur, and the erosion of the Left’s historic support base weakened the party’s dominance. Over time, the CPI(M) failed to sustain its multi-class and inter-communal coalition, particularly losing Muslim voter trust. M J Akbar, writing in the Times of India in 2009, observed that while the CPI(M) once enjoyed Muslim confidence, the party’s later political choices alienated them. He noted that despite there being several Muslim-majority constituencies, the CPI(M) often refrained from fielding Muslim candidates, which contributed to the perception of neglect and to the erosion of its secular credentials.
Kerala
Kerala’s left movements achieved one of the most enduring democratic socialist experiments. Through redistributive land reforms, public education and health initiatives, Kerala produced exceptionally high human development indicators. Despite alternating governments, policy continuity on social sectors persisted. However, fiscal pressures, limited industrialisation and heavy dependence on remittances remain constraints on deeper structural transformation.
Chile
Under Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity government(1970-1973), Chile pursued nationalisation, agrarian reform, and wealth redistribution via a democratic mandate. These initiatives embodied the democratic road to socialism but provoked fierce opposition from business elites, the military, and the US. The 1973 coup ended the experiment violently, underscoring the fragility of democratic socialism in polarised Cold War contexts.
Indonesia
In Indonesia, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) became the largest non-ruling communist party globally by the early 1960s. It mobilised peasants, workers and intellectuals within Seokarno’s nationalist framework. The 1965-1966 anti-communist massacres, however, eradicated the PKI and ended any democratic socialist prospect. This illustrates the vulnerability of socialist movements in militarised postcolonial states.
Uruguay
Uruguay’s Frente Amplio coalition (from 2005 onward) represents a successful democratic left trajectory within capitalist democracy. Through social welfare expansion, income redistribution and human rights reforms, it reduced poverty and inequality. However, it remained constrained by global market conditions and fiscal prudence.
Comparative Synthesis
Comparative experiences show that democratic socialism thrives where institutions ensure pluralism, class coalitions remain inclusive, and reforms are embedded within state structures. Kerala and Uruguay achieved sustainable models due to democratic resilience and adaptive governance. Conversely, Chile and Indonesia’s socialist projects collapsed under external and domestic authoritarian pressures. West Bengal’s decline demonstrates how failure to renew class and communal alliances can undo decades of progressive governance. However, democratic socialist politics can be built around the agenda of fiscal reforms.
Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) presents a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital and economic growth, highlighting the role of taxes in shaping wealth distribution. According to Piketty, the root cause of economic inequality lies in the fact that the rate of return on capital (r) tends to exceed the rate of economic growth (g), leading to an accumulation of wealth among the rich. To mitigate this issue, Piketty advocates a progressive global tax on capital, which would help reduce wealth inequality and promote economic stability. Piketty proposes three variants of this tax, including a rate of zero percent below € one million, one percent from € 1-5 million, and two percent above € five million. He believes that this tax would provide a way to control the dynamics of global capital wealth and avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral. Perhaps we need to struggle for establishing a similar tax regime in Pakistan to make it a welfare state.
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[1] This phrase was originally used by Andrew Young for the United States system “socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor,” and Martin Luther King Jr. frequently used this wording in his speeches. Since at least 1969, Gore Vidal widely disseminated the expression “free enterprise for the poor and socialism for the rich” to describe the US’s economic policies.
(Editor’s Note: Whether the power of capital may be defeated in an incremental way through democratic means still remains to be proved in both theory and practice. Let the debate continue.)