Volume 6, No. 12, December 2024
Editor: Rashed Rahman
The recently held elections to the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Legislative Assembly indicate that India has failed in its strategic objectives on J&K. In December 2023, the Supreme Court directed the Election Commission of India to restore the democratic process by September 30, 2024. The order also upheld the revocation of Article 370 and deemed it to be within the laws set by the Constitution. Foreign diplomats were allowed to observe the election but foreign journalists were kept out. These elections were held from September 18-October 1, 2024 in three phases to elect its 90 members. The election results were announced on October 8, 2024. The opposition INDIA alliance won a majority of seats in the election, 49 of the 90 seats, with the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference winning the highest number of seats. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the largest share of the popular vote. This is the first Assembly election in over a decade, the first since the territory’s special status was revoked, its statehood withdrawn, a martial curfew imposed, and over 300 political leaders detained or under house arrest in 2019. The BJP government, in a presidential decree issued on August 5, 2019, revoked Articles 370 and 35A of India’s Constitution that guaranteed special rights to the Muslim-majority state, including its right to its own Constitution and decision-making process for all matters except defence, foreign affairs and communications. In the follow-up to the move, India sent thousands of additional troops to the region, imposing a curfew on parts of the besieged state and shutting down telecommunications.
Modi was trying to do in J&K what Israel had been doing in the West Bank and Gaza. Since 1967, the Israelis have splintered the West Bank, dotted it with Jewish settlements, and encircled the Palestinian cities and villages, reducing them into several Bantustans (a term used by the white rulers in apartheid South Africa for the Black African towns surrounded from all sides by white settlements). The Israelis have failed to achieve their objective of cleansing the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Palestinians. The Palestinian population in the occupied territories has swelled to more than one million people.
What is Modi up to? After abrogating Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution, Modi wants to fragment the Indian-held J&K and annex each fragment with a contiguous Indian state. This, he thinks, will scatter the Kashmiris to the four winds, break their cohesive national identity, and render them unable to unify for a common cause and struggle. The J&K State, with ten million people, is larger in area than Pakistani Punjab. Pakistani Balochistan has approximately the same population as Indian-held J&K. The West Bank (5,860 square kilometers) can sit easily into the Chakwal District (6,609 square kilometers) of Pakistan’s Punjab province. The Gaza Strip is about the size of Philadelphia, Detroit, or the South American country of Grenada. Recolonising the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley will be a much more complex problem than Israeli attempts to change the demography of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
What is the Pakistan Factor? Close on the heels of independence followed a massive influx of refugees from India. Hardly a month after Partition had elapsed when the spectre of Kashmir started breathing down Pakistan’s neck. A frail Pakistani government, smarting from the wounds of Partition and the massive challenges of establishing refugee camps, lacked the political will and military power to address the problem. This heralded the evolution of a peculiar mindset that would define the future decision-making process in Pakistan.
The Indian National Congress’ (INC’s) mindset can be gleaned from a letter written by Nehru to Brigadier Cariappa, a member of the Reconstitution Committee formed to oversee the division of armies: “Let things take shape for a while. But I am convinced there will finally be a united and strong India. We must go through the valley of shadows before we reach the sunlit mountaintop” (Khanduri, 2007). Nehru once remarked to B K Nehru: “Let us see for how long they last” (Singh, 2012).
Pakistan’s relevance in the First Kashmir War and afterward – the so-called Pakistan Factor, rests upon the following props:
The idea of a unified Indian Army
There was a strong lobby, comprising both Hindu and Muslim officers of the armed forces, INC leaders and the British administration, which was vehemently opposed to the division of the British Indian Army into the Dominion Armies of India and Pakistan. Immediately after independence, the Pakistan Army’s senior officers raised the hare if they owed allegiance to Pakistan’s Governor General or Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, Supreme Commander of the Indian Armed Forces, located in New Delhi. This controversy continued well into 1948. Jinnah visited the Command & Staff College, Quetta, on June 4, 1948 to make it clear that it was the Governor General to whom the Army officers owed allegiance. Jinnah rejected the idea of a Supreme Command for the dominions of India and Pakistan because it would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty.
Messervy’s dubious role
Did Messervy disobey Jinnah’s orders to invade J&K? During the Partition, Brigadier C P Murry, a British officer, commanded the Bannu Frontier Brigade Group. Major Onkar Singh Kalkat, a Sikh officer, was the Brigade Major (BM). The Brigade Commander and his BM were waiting to return to England and India respectively. It was in August 1947, some Indian authors claim, that Kalkat stumbled upon the information related to Operation Gulmarg, Pakistan Army’s operational plan for the invasion of J&K. The operation was to commence in October. As BM, Kalkat was authorised to open letters for Brigadier Murry in his absence. On August 20, 1947, Kalkat opened one such letter from General Frank Messervy, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, and found attached the plans for Operation Gulmarg.
According to the plan, 20 lashkars (tribal militias), each consisting of 1,000 Pashtun tribesmen, were to be recruited from among various Pashtun tribes, and armed at the brigade headquarters at Bannu, Wana, Peshawar, Kohat, Thall and Nowshera by the first week of September. They were expected to reach the marshalling area at Abbottabad on October 18 and cross into J&K on October 22. Ten lashkars were expected to attack the Kashmir Valley through Muzaffarabad and another ten lashkars were expected to join the rebels in Poonch, Bhimber and Rawalakot to advance to Jammu. The Indian story relates that, even though Major Kalkat conveyed the information to the Indian authorities, he was not taken seriously. Senior Indian officials delayed taking action on Kalkat’s information.
If Kalkat’s story about General Messervy’s letter to Commander Bannu Frontier Brigade Group was correct, we can draw two deductions from it. Either Messervy endorsed the plan, or Kalkat’s story was a lie planted by India to justify India’s invasion of J&K. Messervy’s conduct during the war compels us to believe that, while threatening Jinnah to withdraw British officers if the Pakistan Army formally entered J&K, he tacitly agreed to an unconventional war employing Muslim veterans of the British Indian Army, tribesmen from NWFP’s tribal belt and Afghanistan, and some ex-INA officers. Messervy feigned ignorance while Prime Minister (PM) Liaquat Ali Khan tasked Colonel Akbar Khan (later promoted to Major General) of the Pakistan Army to set up a covert command headquarters to organise and execute the operations in J&K. In March 1948, Messervy prodded the political leadership to formally employ the Pakistan Army to prevent the Indian Army from advancing beyond the line Uri-Poonch-Naushera. The British favoured Pakistan retaining Azad J&K. This reinforces the thesis that the war in J&K, like the events in Baramula, Gilgit & Baltistan, was choreographed.
The proxy war
The main reasons the political and military leadership vacillated in employing the army were: 1) the confusion in the minds of senior Pakistan Army officers about the chain of command, and 2) the constraint not to annoy Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, lest he withdrew the British officers. Pakistan’s politicians and civil/military bureaucrats are masters of deception. While the Pakistan government, including its GHQ, feigned ignorance, this war was masterminded and executed (with the tacit approval of Pakistan’s PM and General Messervy – the Army Chief) by two serving Colonels of the Pakistan army – Colonels Akbar Khan and Sher Khan were serving as Director of Weapons & Equipment and Deputy Director of Military Intelligence respectively at GHQ. For this purpose, Akbar Khan was to coordinate with the Muslim Conference led by Sardar Ibrahim, a lawyer hailing from Rawalakot. From October 1947 to March 1948, Colonel Akbar and Colonel Sher Khan masterminded and led the proxy war through tribesmen and volunteers.
The programmed delay at Baramulla
On October 23, 1947, the invaders entered the Jhelum Valley and reached Muzaffarabad (Kaul, 1967). Some state forces even revolted and joined the raiders. Afterward, the raiders advanced towards Baramula, located about 55 km (34 mi) from Srinagar, the state’s summer capital. The way to Srinagar was open. Rather than advancing towards Srinagar before state forces could regroup or be reinforced, the invaders stayed in the captured cities in the border region, engaged in looting and arson. In the Poonch Valley, the state forces retreated into towns where they were besieged.
The Indian airlift
The Maharaja signed the instrument of accession on October 26, 1947. In his book Lamb (1990) indulges in an academic argument that the instrument of accession was signed on the evening of November 27, “that is to say, after the Indian troops began overtly to intervene in the State’s affairs on the morning of 27 October 1947”. For the Indians, saving Srinagar and controlling its surrounding areas was the key to securing the Kashmir Valley, Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh. The most suitable way to do this was by airlifting troops to Srinagar. Hence, on October 26, India decided to airlift 161 Infantry Brigade to Srinagar and move the 50 Parachute Brigade into Jammu overland. On October 27, mustering all the military and civilian passenger planes it could lay its hands on, India undertook a massive airlift of troops and equipment to Srinagar to counter the invasion (Sinha, 2002). Starting first light on October 27, the advance elements of 161 Brigade comprising two companies from 1 Sikh Regiment and a battery from the 13 Field Regiment were airborne from Palam airport. The civilian Dakotas landed on the Srinagar airfield at 08:30 hours. Contrary to the earlier gossip and speculation, the raiders were nowhere in sight. They were still in Baramula, 55 km from Srinagar. During this period of uncertainty for the Indian troops, instead of waiting for the arrival of the raiders, CO 1 Sikh advanced his force, making contact with the attackers in the vicinity of Baramula. The CO was killed in the ensuing skirmish, however, the Indians succeeded in delaying the enemy’s advance. The Royal Indian Air Force wanted to impede the raiders’ movement towards Srinagar. For this purpose, it started strafing the Baramula-Srinagar Road on the second or third day of the operation. The161 Brigade rendezvoused in the Srinagar area by November 2 (Singh, 2000).
On October 31, 1947, the Gilgit Scouts, commanded by Major W A Brown and Captain A S Mathieson revolted against the Maharaja. The rebels had the support of the locals with whom the Maharaja’s regime was never popular. Mountbatten wanted Pakistan to retain Gilgit & Baltistan. The revolt by the British officers commanding Gilgit Scouts was a cover-up.
By December 1948 the Indian Army was firmly in control of the Jhelum Valley, Poonch and Ladakh. The Pakistani political and military leadership now feared that encouraged by their successes, the Indians would try to eliminate the sliver of J&K territory that remained with Pakistan. They were particularly concerned about a likely Indian advance towards Mirpur and Bhimber. Gracey presented a plan to meet this threat. The Plan, called Operation Venus, envisaged a counterstroke involving an armoured brigade and an infantry brigade attacking from the Bhimber area to control Beri Pattan road, which was the Indian line of communications to Naushera, Poonch and Jhangar. A subsidiary operation aimed at capturing the two hills overlooking the area was not launched for some flimsy reason, or deferred to wait for the next Indian move in this area. On December 14, 1948, a reduced Operation Venus, involving only heavy artillery shelling in the Beri Pattan area, without any physical attack, was executed. The shelling continued for two days and temporarily disrupted the movement of Indian supply convoys on the Akhnur-Naushera road. At 23:59 hours on January 1, 1949, Pakistan accepted the cease-fire. The Indian Army’s Spring offensive was designed to fail, to facilitate the Pakistan Army to retain the mountain barrier that separates Pakistani Punjab from the Srinagar Valley.
The cease-fire
Having failed in securing J&K by force, subsequent Pakistani governments had to console their people by hiding behind the UN resolutions. The UN has never taken its resolutions seriously unless the national interests of the permanent members of the Security Council are involved. What was the UN’s role in the Kashmir imbroglio? The UN Security Council first took cognizance of the J&K issue in December 1947 at India’s behest. India’s request to the Security Council, cleverly conceived, said: “Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the North West, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu & Kashmir, a state which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India…The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance which is an act of aggression against India.”
India thus became the ‘complainant’ before the Security Council against ‘aggression’ by Pakistan. The UN Security Council appointed a UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The UNCIP, taking note of the developments, adopted a resolution on August 13, 1948, divided into three parts. Part 1 of the resolution called for a cease-fire in the disputed territory. Part 2 called for Pakistan to withdraw the raiders and vacate the territory occupied by it. Then after the above stipulation had been implemented, India was to withdraw the bulk of the Indian Army from the State, leaving an adequate number behind to ensure that the Government of J&K maintained law and order, providing India a legal lacuna to claim that the UNCIP believed that J&K was a part of India. Part 3 of the resolution, to be implemented after the implementation of the first and second parts, stated that both India and Pakistan had reaffirmed their wish that the future status of J&K would be determined following the people’s will.
The First Kashmir War left India in possession of two-thirds of J&K while Pakistan controlled the remaining one-third part according to Part 1 of the UNCIP resolution. As for Part 2, Pakistan did not vacate Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas in preparation for and to facilitate a plebiscite in the disputed state. Had Pakistan vacated these areas, the Indian Army would have quickly occupied them. The very idea of Indians sitting on the Kohala bridge and policing Gilgit and Baltistan was unacceptable to Pakistan. So, Pakistan did a wise thing by not withdrawing from these areas. However, by not withdrawing, Pakistan technically violated part 2 of the UNCIP resolution. It gave India an excuse to renege on the implementation of Part 3.
The grand design
Messervy disobeying Jinnah’s orders was a deception that the Pakistani civil and military leadership had created. In October 1947, when Messervy was on leave, Gracy, deputising for Messervy, conveyed to Pakistan’s PM that Britain would withdraw its officers if the Pakistan Army invaded J&K. However, Messervy gave a nod to Operation Gulmarg – the secret war to be launched by Pakistan with the help of tribesmen, veterans, and serving Pakistani officers shown on leave. During the secret war in J&K, Messervy kept sanctioning arms and ammunition for the invaders. In March 1948, Messervy prodded the political leadership to employ the Pakistan Army to prevent the Indian Army from advancing beyond the line Uri-Poonch-Naushera. The objective was to prevent the Pakistan Army from invading J&K with full force. The movers and shakers wanted India to take the Valley, Ladakh (as a checkmate on China), and the Jammu region.
Mountbatten orchestrated a rebellion by the Gilgit Scouts through Major Brown, to hand over Gilgit and Baltistan to Pakistan without a fight. The result was the huge Pakistani plug of Gilgit-Baltistan that prevented India from expanding into the Eurasian landmass. Through foot-slogging infantry marches, Pakistan retained the mountain barrier of Azad Kashmir that separated the Jhelum Valley from the plains of West Punjab. Subsequently, a military line (the Cease-Fire Line) was established in J&K to keep India and Pakistan militarily engaged forever. The war in J&K, like the delay by Pakistani infiltrators in Baramula to facilitate the Indian Army’s invasion of J&K, and the choreographed handing over of Gilgit & Baltistan to Pakistan was the British legacy that has kept India and Pakistan embroiled in chasing the ghost of J&K since October 1947.
Pakistani raiders, led by two serving army colonels, who infiltrated into J&K in October 1947, reached Baramulla, 55 km away from Srinagar, and then stopped there. They kept wandering in and around Baramulla, facilitating the Indian Army to airlift, in phases, an infantry brigade to Srinagar. The war in fact ended when the Indian troops landed in Srinagar, even if it dragged on for more than a year.
What would have happened if India and Pakistan called each other’s bluff and agreed to a simultaneous withdrawal according to the UNCIP Resolution? Such a possibility presented itself twice or thrice when Owen Dixon tried to bring both parties to the negotiation table to facilitate a settlement. Sheikh Abdullah, in his biography, Atish-e-Chinar, states that whenever such a possibility arose the intellect of Pakistani leaders (borrowing an Urdu expression) “went grazing grass” and they quarreled over whether the Indian Army should be allowed to keep two divisions or just one division in the state before the ascertaining of the will of the Kashmiris. It should not be construed from Pakistan’s behaviour that the Indians were eager to settle this dispute (India calls it an ‘issue’). Hence the perpetual stalemate.
Any future attempt by Pakistan to attack the Indian-controlled Kashmir will result in an Indian response across the international border. During the 1965 and Kargil Wars, Pakistan repeated the mistakes it had committed during the Colonels’ War – it used non-state actors to achieve its military objectives, and failing to do so, knocked at the door of the UN (White House in the case of the Kargil War).
REFERENCES
The writer is a retired military officer.