Balochistan’s Imbroglio: A Marxist Gramscian Perspective – II
Saulat Nagi

Bhutto’s era became what Gramsci calls a “Caesarist parliamentary dictatorship”, resembling the elected dictatorships of Depretis, Crispi and Giolitti in Italy. It absorbed the opposition or eliminated it. It strengthened the bureaucracy initially weakened by the Bhutto government. Bonapartism was the logical outcome of the passive hegemony the populist government was clinging to. Bhutto was forced to introduce Islamisation – a farce to begin with though turning a sect into non-Muslims using the parliamentary two-thirds majority reinforced his dwindling hegemony but proved counterproductive for his domination. But his real agenda of introducing massive land reforms and his proximity to China led to irreconcilable conflict between the fundamental classes. The conflict became so acute that it could not be contained by a parliamentary dictatorship.
Predicting the coup against Bhutto, Pakistan Progressive (reproduced by Aijaz Ahmed) wrote, “This type of regime is likely not to start in the tradition of Suharto or Pinochet; rather, it is likely to adopt a populist and puritanical stance…In the name of an ‘Islamic way of life’, it will impose a medieval labour code in the factories; will weed out all remnants of intellectual life in the universities; and will seek to reverse all the marginal gains the peasantry has made during struggles of the past five years…and terror under such a regime, if it comes about, is likely to reach a scale heretofore unknown and unimagined in our body politic. (Roots of Dictatorship 1983).
“The military are the permanent reserves of order and conservatism; they are a political force which comes into action ‘publicly’ when ‘legality’ is in danger” (Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 215).
The Baloch leadership saw through Zia’s opportunism and duplicity. But what more could they have expected? Many opted for self-imposed exile. The most tragic aspect of this entire Shakespearean drama was that no sooner had the leaders been released from prison that the armed resistance, which had raged in the mountains for autonomy or liberation but been on hold since September 1977, ceased. The pattern that had emerged under Ayub Khan repeated itself – no lessons drawn, no structural shifts. In this respect, Rashed Rahman’s insights remain both relevant and credible.
Briefly this era can be summarised as Populism to Counterrevolution (1971-1977): Bhutto’s civilian populism initially challenged military power (progressive Caesarism), yet his reliance on inherited structures invited reactionary forces. Zia’s 1977 coup epitomised reactionary Caesarism, using direct coercion and Islamist hegemony to crush dissent and carried Pakistan to “unchartered seas and unpathed waters” through the Afghan Jihad.
What Makes a Nation
Before delving deeper into the Baloch question, it is essential to grapple with the broader theoretical issue: What constitutes a nation? Taj Mohammad Breseeg, a prominent Baloch scholar, tackles this in his book Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development up to 1980 (2004).
“The Baloch nationalists…argue that they constitute a national community, in the fullest sense of the word, and occupy a relatively well-defined territory (which is the strongest argument anyone has to the right to self-determination). Apart from common ethnic bond and common historical experiences, the Baloch’s common cultural heritage includes language, religion, and all other manifestations like food, dress and perhaps their entire way of life. From the 17th century until 1928 and 1948 respectively, Balochistan preserved its independent status. The Baloch country maintained diplomatic relations with Mughal India, Ottoman Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Oman and British India. Its occupation by the modern armies of Iran in 1928, and Pakistan in March 1948, led to the birth of the Baloch liberation movement.”
He adds, “In the post-Cold War period, ethno-nationalism has assumed prominence because some new countries were constituted on the basis of ethnicity and this raised the expectations of many ethnic groups to be able to achieve their cherished goal of establishing a new country on the basis of ethnicity and nationalism.”
These are strong arguments but not enough to justify an ethno-tribal region being called a nation. Croats, Serbs, Bosnians and several other countries born out of the womb of former Yugoslavia –not long ago a fully viable and independent state recognised by the UN – are South Slavic, and despite the common culture, territory, heritage and even languages, they were broken into pieces,once again proving that a nation state is a capitalist construct. Their main problem was not the concept of nationhood but the uneven growth of capitalism. Montenegro and Croatia were well developed while Bosnia and Kosovo remained backward. As Yeltsin wasn’t prepared to drag the backward Central Asian Republics along with Russia, an almost similar phenomenon happened there.
Srecko Horvet and Igor Sticks write, “The IMF was one of the culprits of the war in Yugoslavia, but not because its austerity measures made workers and unions take to the streets and then go to war to vent their frustration. Stratfor makes it sound as if the discontented workers dashed straight from the social protests to swell the ranks of national armies and immediately started singing Serbian and Croatian nationalist songs instead of the Internationale. But the war was not caused by the losers who ended up on the streets due to the IMF measures. Rather, it was triggered by the nationalist elites, from which the future ‘winners of transition’ were to emerge, led by the tycoons. They succeeded precisely because the protests of the workers and unions did not, and so the class conflict was masked by ethnic wars, and the workers magically disappeared, to be replaced by Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, etc” (Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism).
The US, a conglomerate of various states, hardly falls into the definition of a nation. Even Australia, lacking the constituents of a nation, is united under the banner of a Commonwealth, where the six states and two territories are coalesced to form a federation under capitalist necessity (Watch John Pilger’s interview with Tariq Ali about Australia).
For Stalin, a nation is not a racial or tribal unit, but a historically constituted community. As Aijaz Ahmad elaborates, a nation is a stable community sharing common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a shared culture. Stalin insists that none of these elements alone is sufficient, but the absence of any one of them disqualifies a group from being a nation. He further asserts that a nation is not merely a historical category, but one belonging to a specific epoch: the rise of capitalism.
Applying these criteria to Balochistan, Aijaz Ahmad urges us to evaluate the national question comprehensively. From a Marxist perspective, the historical evolution of social organisation for economic production and the consolidation of the polity into statehood or the aspiration for statehood are essential prerequisites.
Yuri Gankovsky, a Soviet historian, contends that the formation of a distinct Baloch feudal nationality began between the 13th and 15th centuries. Thus, the Baloch should not be seen merely as a scattered national minority, but as a nation in the fullest sense. They constitute a stable population inhabiting a relatively defined territory in southwest Asia, speaking a common language (Balochi), and possessing the foundational elements of a unified national economy.
Although artificial political frontiers divide Baluchistan into different regions, these boundaries have failed to sever the economic lifelines between them. In fact, unofficial trade across these arbitrary borders remains robust – sustaining thousands and reinforcing the economic interconnectedness of the Baloch people.
Gankovsky concedes, however, that the Baloch are the only one of Pakistan’s major ethnic groups that had not yet consolidated into a bourgeois nation by the time of decolonisation. Their national consolidation, he argues, remains incomplete – a process still in motion.
Who are the Baloch, and Has a Nation Been Formed?
To assess whether the Baloch constitute a nation in the Marxist sense, we must first examine their historical roots, language, ethnic homogeneity, territory and social organisation for economic development, which define a Nation.
Selig Harrison captures the paradox: “To the neighbouring tribes, Balochistan is ‘the dump where Allah shot the rubbish of creation.’ But for the Baloch, their sense of identity is closely linked to the austere land where they have lived for at least a thousand years.” Ethnically, the Baloch are no longer homogenous, as the original nucleus absorbed Central Asian and Arab groups over centuries. Yet, culturally, they have retained a strong identity and memory of resisting invasions.
The Baloch are believed to have migrated from the Caspian Sea region. Aijaz Ahmad notes that they “sojourned in Northern (Iranian) Balochistan long enough before arriving in Southern (Pakistani) Balochistan to have left identifiable linguistic traces, particularly affinities between Balochi and Iranian dialects like Farvi and Khur” (The National Question in Baluchistan, 1983).
Some Baloch claim Arab ancestry. Selig Harrison documents this narrative, stating that some Baloch leaders trace their lineage to Aleppo. This theory gained traction during the Iran-Iraq War among Arab commentators. Riyad Najib Al-Rayyes in the Saudi-backed Al-Mustakbal argued for Arab ethnic roots of the Baloch. Ma’n Shana al-Ajili Al-Hakkami published a 310-page book in Bahrain in 1979 titled Baluchistan: Land of Arabs, sponsored by a wealthy Baloch sheikh in Bahrain, Mohammad bin Hassan Al-Mohammad, who led the Hoots tribe and founded the Islamic Arabic Front for the Liberation of Baluchistan.
These advocates wanted the Baloch to abandon Balochi in favour of Arabic and create an Arab republic in South Asia. However, the idea was met with rejection in Pakistan. “We are Aryans, like the Kurds!” Ataullah Mengal protested. “We aren’t Semites! If we give up Balochi, how can we call ourselves Baloch?” Khair Bux Marri added, “If they think we are Arabs, we need not argue about our history. What matters to us is our freedom.”
(To be continued)