Volume 7, No. 11, November 2025
Editor: Rashed Rahman
The partition of India in 1947 led to the creation of an ethnically and linguistically diverse Pakistan. While East Pakistan was more culturally and linguistically homogenous, West Pakistan was less so, with five major languages, various dialects, religions, castes and tribal identities. Many groups in Pakistan have similar cultural affiliations with groups outside the borders. The Pashtuns, for example, are also found in eastern Afghanistan, while the Baloch, in southern Afghanistan and Iran.
The state ideology was based on three founding principles: Islam would be the unifying force; Urdu would be the language of the people, and the military would be strengthened to counter ‘Hindu India’. Instead of establishing institutions that would accord equal rights to the various ethno-linguistic groups, the state projected Islam as their common denominator. The policy exacerbated ethnic divisions in the innately diverse nation; the assertion of any ethno-linguistic identity in the context of seeking political rights was seen as divisive.
Each of these ethnic groups has had a unique path to mobilisation. Yet, across all of them, the drivers of ethnic conflict are largely the same: the lack of provincial autonomy; economic exploitation, and political and military oppression.
Lack of Provincial Autonomy
In the first few decades of Pakistan’s existence as a sovereign territory, the politics of the nation was defined by the government’s ‘One Unit’ plan. The scheme involved the integration of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan into a single province of West Pakistan. The aim was to neutralise the Bengali majority in East Pakistan. It was strongly opposed by the people of NWFP, Balochistan and Sindh. By then, some of the Pashtuns had been coopted by the Pakistani leadership and were either part of mainstream politics or serving in the military and becoming the second largest ethnic group within the army. The One Unit plan thwarted any sort of autonomy for the different ethnic groups. In NWFP, Ghaffar Khan led the movement against One Unit, undertaking tours across the tribal region to address rallies and raise ethno-nationalist consciousness against the plan. 6. The Pakistani state naturally saw the Pashtun nationalist leaders as projecting their Pashtun identity above their Islamic identity.
Following Kalat’s annexation in 1948, the Pakistani government announced that it would be treated in the same manner as it was during the British era.7 This meant the appointment of a political agent, entrusted with the powers to look after the state administration and guide the government on the internal matters of the state. The Baloch strongly resisted Pakistan’s assertion, seeing them as no different from the British. The government responded by banning political parties in Kalat and arresting the Baloch leadership. Over the years, the government in Islamabad has repeatedly tried to assimilate Baloch identity into the larger Pakistan identity. Since 1947, the state has engaged the Baloch in violent confrontations on five occasions (1948, 1958, 1962, 1973-77 and 2002 onwards).
The One Unit scheme sparked a violent uprising in Balochistan as the policy decreased Baloch representation at the federal level and forestalled the establishment of a provincial Assembly, which had yet to be approved by the central government nearly a decade after Partition. The Khan of Kalat mobilised tribal leaders against the scheme, which they saw as the federal government’s way of centralising power and limiting provincial autonomy. The government arrested the Baloch leaders and crushed the revolt. The province continued to be treated like a colony and the central government continued to exploit its resources.8
Economic Exploitation
Deposits of natural gas were discovered in the Sui area of Balochistan in 1952 and piped to Punjab and Karachi soon after. Yet, it took 30 years for the gas supply to reach the capital city of Balochistan and that too because it was needed in the Quetta cantonment.9 At the same time, skirmishes were regularly taking place between the tribal guerillas and the army, villages were being bombed, and rebel leaders arrested or killed. All this helped fuel anti-Pakistan sentiment.
Decades later, the sense of betrayal and exploitation that the Baloch have felt at the hands of the Pakistani establishment would continue. In the 1960s, a new generation of Baloch leaders emerged who were influenced by Marxist guerrilla movements in other parts of the world. They demanded the withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Baloch areas, the scrapping of the One Unit plan, and the restoration of a unified Balochistan. The fighting continued until Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan as Pakistan President and ended the One Unit plan. This led to the amalgamation of British Balochistan with the erstwhile state of Kalat, and thereby the merging of Pashtun and Baloch regions into one province of Balochistan.
Over the years, Balochistan has functioned as a Pakistani colony with its economy being run on the extraction of natural resources like minerals and hydrocarbon. The province, however, lags behind in physical and economic infrastructure, human capital, and investments. Moreover, the resources being extracted from its territory are processed elsewhere, leaving the people of Balochistan with little share of the revenues generated by the province.10
In the tribal areas, the Pashtuns have been similarly neglected by the Pakistani state. The region is an important part of the Afghan poppy trade. The smuggling of illicit goods, including weapons and drugs, across the border prompted the opening up of new trading and business opportunities for tribes in the region. As a result, posts in the Pakistani administrative and security apparatus in the border areas became highly lucrative, with agents getting a share of the profits being made by the smugglers. As Pakistan launched its military operations in the region, businesses and livelihoods were affected by the violence that followed, causing damage to the local economy. With no economic regulation nor a proper judicial system, and with the explosion of militancy-related violence, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) suffered over the years, and today remain significantly underdeveloped.
Political and Military Oppression
The National Awami Party (NAP) defined Pashtun and Baloch politics in the early decades of Pakistan’s creation. Formed in 1957, the NAP included noted Pashtun, Baloch, Sindhi and Bengali nationalist thinkers and politicians, whose objective was for greater autonomy for the non-Punjabi populations of the country.11 In 1967, the party split into two factions over differences on how to achieve a socialist revolution. The pro-Soviet faction (which worked to achieve provincial autonomy in a democratic manner) was led by Wali Khan, the son of Ghaffar Khan. In the 1970 election, the NAP-Wali faction emerged as the single largest party in Balochistan, forming a coalition government led by Sardar Ataullah Mengal along with the Islamic Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). In NWFP, NAP-Wali put up an impressive performance as well. Fearing that NAP would make the western region, especially Balochistan, another rebellious East Pakistan, then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the Mengal government nine months after its formation, accusing it of undermining the state, exceeding constitutional limits, and getting involved with the Iraqis and Russians. The sacking of the government (the NAP-JUI government in NWFP resigned in protest) frustrated any idea of provincial autonomy and set the stage for Balochistan’s fourth rebellion, which would engulf the province for the next four years. NAP was banned in 1975 but re-emerged as the Awami National Party (ANP), an entirely Pakhtun nationalist party working in the tribal regions and NWFP.
In the late 1960s, Pakistan consolidated the administration of the tribal regions with the inclusion of Dir, Swat, Malakand and Hazara in NWFP, and leaving the rest of the tribal areas as they were, declaring them to be Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and placing them under the President. Administratively, it consisted of seven Political Agencies and six Frontier Regions that were controlled by political agents appointed by the federal government. However, the term ‘federally administered’ is a misnomer as the tribal regions are not federally administered at all. Constitutionally, Islamabad has never maintained legal jurisdiction over more than 100 meters to the left and the right of a few paved roads in the tribal areas.12
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Pakistan government began a massive social engineering experiment. President Muhammad Ziaul Haq pursued a policy of Islamisation, giving orders for instance for the construction of thousands of madrassas in the Pashtun areas. These emphasised the importance of Islam over ethnic identity and were largely funded by private Saudi agencies. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 intensified this policy, changing the nature of the western border permanently. Pakistan began supporting the Afghan resistance with material and financial support from the US and Saudi Arabia. US interests were limited to stopping the spread of Soviet communist influence; for its part, Saudi Arabia, equally driven by the Iranian Revolution, worked to promote conservative Wahhabi Sunni Islam.
Zia received billions of US and Saudi aid that allowed him to strengthen Sunni madrassas and provide funding for militants to fight the Soviets. The promotion of Islamic identity and ideology during this time created an atmosphere for the rise of the mullah or Islamic cleric, as a powerful leader. In the tribal areas, the mullahs engaged in misinformation campaigns, brainwashing and recruiting fighters from local mosques and madrassas for jihad. Jamaat-e-Islami, a radical Islamist party, was the first location for Saudi ‘charities and religious organisations’ to donate money, allowing the Saudi state to distance itself from the notion that it was officially supporting jihad. The war would reinforce the role of the madrassas as the first step in the process of recruiting and training fighters for jihad.13
With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, thousands of mujahideen across the Durand Line fought for power in Kabul. From 1996-2001, the Taliban, a predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group came to power. Backed by massive support from Pakistan, the group rose to power and led the continuing deconstruction and dismantling of traditional tribal structures, particularly in the Pashtun tribal areas. While a majority of the commanders of the Taliban were Pashtun, the group has never reflected traditional Pashtun thinking and customs, nor does it seek to represent the interests of all Pashtuns.14 In the years that followed, the Taliban would enforce their strict policies on Afghanistan: they imposed strict Islamic laws, forbade women from attending educational institutions or working, and banned television, music and non-Islamic holidays. The Taliban also provided sanctuary to al Qaeda, the group responsible for the September 11 terror attacks that would force the US to return to South Asia, fight in Afghanistan and make deals with Pakistan.
Endnotes:
(To be continued)