Volume 7, No. 6, June 2025
Editor: Rashed Rahman
The historic dharna (sit-in) at Babarloo and the temporary halt of the canals project by the Council of Common Interests (CCI) have sparked debates in Sindhi society. Some people label the entire dharna as a conspiracy, claiming that the ‘rulers’ orchestrated it to divert Sindh’s eight-month-long movement away from nationalist parties and instead entangle it in the net of a single lawyer, ultimately pacifying the entire movement with hollow promises. According to this narrative, the state deliberately incurred a loss of $ 20 million daily, ‘incited’ thousands of Sindhis to gather, and ultimately scripted the entire episode leading up to the CCI’s decision. It seems as if every phenomenon in the universe is manipulated by the Pakistani establishment and Zardari!
On the other hand, the general public is ecstatic. For the first time, they have felt their own power and believe that Sindh can dictate terms to the Federation. They now believe that the entire system thrives on the exploitation of Sindh’s resources and ports. If the routes from the federation (Punjab) are blocked and Sindh asserts ownership over its ports, routes and resources, the ‘hard state’ could buckle within 12 days. This idea was once limited to political rhetoric by Sindhi activists, but the Sindhi nation has now turned it into a historic lesson and a collective memory, embedding it into their shared subconscious, ready to be invoked repeatedly.
So, what is the truth? Amidst these contradictory narratives, where does reality lie? As a political party leader involved in the anti-canals movement and the Babarloo protest, and as a lawyer active in the lawyers’ movement and internal affairs over the past year, I aim to present a critical review based on firsthand experience. This will help us understand the issue intellectually and politically, avoiding conspiracy theories. In this article, I will outline some immediate and overarching points.
The Role of Political Parties and Experts
There is no doubt that the canal issue posed an existential threat, corporate farming is a corporate land grab in Sindh, and the formation of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) in 2023 marked the beginning of a new One-Unit policy. Sindhi nationalist political parties were the first to present this issue to the Sindhi people through statements, conferences and protests, involving experts and intellectuals. When the Board of Investment Act was passed in August 2023, establishing the SIFC, and when the caretaker government allocated 52,000 acres of land to military corporations for corporate farming, and when President Zardari visited the Green Pakistan Initiative office in May 2024, promising to hand over Sindh’s lands, and when he endorsed the six canals in July 2024, where were the ‘sponteneous’ lawyers, doctors, teachers, or peasant activists then? It was the political parties and experts who mobilised the public. Now, certain ‘big names’ are propagating the idea that the anti-canal and anti-corporate farming movement is a non-political movement separate from political parties. This is essentially an attempt to curb the growing politicisation of society. The movement’s beginnings reaffirm that patriotic political parties must and should play a leading role in addressing societal political issues.
Why Did the Anti-Canal Protests Turn into a National Mass Movement?
The movement against the canals and corporate farming, initially limited to political parties, later transformed into a massive national mass movement. It gained such momentum that eyewitnesses of history compare it to the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and anti-Kalabagh Dam movements, calling it even more powerful. Here, I will discuss the fundamental socio-political drivers behind this transformation.
Sindhi society has been undergoing qualitative changes, disrupting traditional power structures. Sindh’s traditional political, economic and social power structure is entrenched in Pakistan’s neocolonial system. The comprador bourgeoisie – Sindh’s urban capitalist and feudal elite – plays a key role in this structure. They are complicit in the exploitation of Sindhis while also leveraging Sindhi ‘nationalism’ to pressure the federation when needed. Over the last 17 years, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has been the representative of this class.
The second layer is Sindh’s traditional middle class, entrenched in bureaucracy and government jobs since the Bhutto era. This class adopts ‘Sindhi nationalism’ to safeguard its economic interests, with its lower strata occasionally vocal on economic issues. However, its upper echelons are economically tied to the state and Sindh’s comprador class, making them entirely dependent on the feudal elite’s patronage.
Post-2000, neoliberal capitalism and urbanisation led to the rapid penetration of capital into society, with real estate and private businesses flourishing. This reshaped Sindh’s social fabric, creating a new middle class. Traditional feudal political patronage was replaced by contractors and businessmen as political patrons. The PPP’s 17-year rule saw the rise of naked money politics in electoral processes and the erosion of rural social values.
While the PPP’s comprador class controls the masses through feudal patronage, it has also strengthened its political patronage network in urban and rural Sindh through this new middle class. The PPP is not just a party of landlords; it trickles down capital to maintain influence through the new neoliberal middle class. A crucial aspect of this neoliberal urbanisation and new professions is the formation of a new middle class, vital for our politics. In the 1990s and 2000s, as ideological politics weakened globally, Sindh’s progressive, nationalist-minded individuals rapidly integrated into this new middle class through print/electronic media, NGOs, diaspora organisations like SANA and World Sindhi Congress, Bar politics, literature organisations, and now digital platforms. This diffusion of Sindh’s ‘nationalist narrative’ without organised political structures led to cultural activism, Bar politics and semi-political cultural activities becoming mainstream. This class wields cultural soft power. The ruling parties, especially the PPP, invest heavily in influencing this class – sponsoring cultural events, building a legal lobby, and extending patronage to media and teacher organisations. However, unlike Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab’s middle class, Sindh’s new middle class is secular and, to an extent, nationalist. When a broader nationalist movement emerges, this class is compelled to side with Sindh.
Tensions in this power structure arise when 60 percent of Sindh’s and the country’s population falls between the ages of 20-30, with the majority belonging to the working class and lower-middle-class youth, whom I refer to as the ‘dispossessed class’. This is the segment that has no place in the current economic and political system, having come of age over the last two decades without economic stability. They are tied to precarious, unstable livelihoods, ranging from the service sector to various informal jobs. This class serves as fertile ground for radical nationalist and progressive ideologies. In the initial phase, this class played a fundamental role in fuelling the political parties’ anti-canals movement and transforming it into a national mass movement. For instance, the lawyers’ movement and dharna against the removal of the SSP in Hyderabad were initiated not by established Bar leaders but by young lawyers who were not part of the Bar’s elite circle and struggled to secure proper legal cases. It was these young lawyers who spearheaded the movement, which later evolved into the anti-canals long march, forcing the privileged Bar leaders to join reluctantly. Subsequently, the students’ resistance on March 4, 2025 turned the entire movement into a mass uprising.
It is also true that this movement is an expression of collective public anger against 77 years of betrayal, exploitation, national oppression, and especially the corrupt rule of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) over the last 17 years. The people of Sindh actively participated in movements for the restoration of democracy in the country, only to be rewarded with 17 years of so-called democracy that served Sindh poorly. Hence, this movement is a national mass uprising rooted in distrust towards the fraudulent federation, with its core slogan being: “The federation, Punjab, the Generals and Zardari are our enemies.” When the movement took on a national mass character, even those from Sindh’s diffused nationalist narrative – individuals belonging to the new middle class described earlier – actively joined in large numbers.
The Crisis of Political Leadership, Populism, and the Babarloo Dharna
For the past two months, all of Sindh has risen – youth, children, women and elders stand united against the canals and corporate farming. On one side is Sindh’s traditional, compromised political leadership, incapable of advancing beyond a point. On the other is the dispossessed class and radical nationalist-progressive forces, still not expansive enough to lead the entire society to a logical conclusion. This is Sindh’s crisis of political leadership, inevitably giving rise to populism.
Political parties failed to unite during the movement. In this postmodern era, short-term tactics are prioritised over long-term strategy. Political parties, bound by strategic thinking, cannot make impulsive decisions, whereas populist figures, devoid of situational awareness, make rash declarations.
In March, populist announcements – like closing the Sindh-Punjab border – were made by a Karachi Bar Association President. Later, Hyderabad, Sukkur and Larkana Bar leaders made bold statements about shutting ports, railways and coal supplies. Serious political figures argued that instead of immediately resorting to ‘nuclear options’, the movement should be strategically prolonged, addressing land issues alongside the canals.
On April 12, 2025, at the All Pakistan Lawyers Convention, our nationalist lawyers advised the Karachi Bar president that such major decisions should not be made unilaterally and that political parties should be consulted. But the populist heroes disregarded this, leading to the Babarloo dharna announcement. Post-announcement, we political lawyers resolved to maximise the dharna’s management and integrate our nationalist agenda, urging patriotic political parties to join. The dharna’s core committee included pro-PPP lawyers, populist figures and our nationalist lawyers. Contrary to the populists’ and pro-PPP lawyers’ expectations, the Babarloo dharna became a national tribunal where thousands of Sindhis daily delivered their referendum against the canals and corporate farming. For the first time in history, Sindh blockaded Punjab’s supply routes for 12 days, forcing the state and Sindh government to retreat on the canals. The dharna’s scale surprised both traditional and populist lawyers, leaving them no room to backtrack. While the canals were the primary agenda, corporate farming was equally important, though they were reluctant to address it. Our nationalist lawyers forcefully included it as an agenda of the sit-in.
When the CCI ruled against the canals, the Karachi Bar president attempted to end the dharna without consulting the core committee. Our nationalist lawyers thwarted this, ensuring the dharna continued until a stance on corporate farming and future struggle was declared. We succeeded in this effort.
Conclusion
From the movement’s inception to the Babarloo dharna, we have won a battle, but the war continues. So long as the threats to the Indus, corporate farming and exploitation of Sindh’s resources persist, the struggle will continue. The Babarloo dharna was not just successful because the state temporarily retreated on the canals project. Its true success lies in restoring the Sindhi people’s collective will to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses and defeat them. Another key victory is that Babarloo did not produce a messiah but instead gave Sindh the taste of collective triumph. However, we must prepare for the next phases of the movement against corporate farming and tougher challenges ahead.