Volume 6, No. 11, November 2024
Editor: Rashed Rahman
In third world countries like Pakistan, the ruling elite’s obsession with centralisation has negated the creation of national integration in a manner that fulfils the requirements of a constitutional arrangement with clear boundaries of the division of power. Furthermore, the failure to establish strong and effective political parties has aggravated the situation. Initially, it was assumed that post-colonial societies like Pakistan would morph into modern states and extreme centralisation would be diluted by accommodating all ethnic, linguistic and religious groups.
However, due to variations in circumstances, the European model has become a bane for multi-ethnic societies like Pakistan. This is a cautionary note, but the explanation strongly justifies this stance. Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, questions of identity and ethno-nationalism remained central. Ethno-nationalism, which emerged after the rise of self-awareness and identity consciousness, created a crisis for countries like Pakistan as the country came into being by the union of already existing provinces – each of which had long established and distinct ethno-linguistic identities.
The claims of ethno-nationalism are believed to be supported on the basis of psychological and socio-cultural traits. In most cases of ethnic recognition, the sentiments are similar. The main purpose is political power, with the objective of redistribution of national resources. In this context, the 18th Amendment to the Constitution was a milestone in the constitutional history of Pakistan. Prior to the 18th Amendment, the distribution of national resources had been skewed to the advantage of the Punjabi elite. This contributed significantly to widespread ethnic tensions and violence by various separatist groups.
A glance at the history of the Baloch, Pashtun, Saraiki and Sindhi people suggests that due to their weak representative political parties and overcentralisation of politico-economic structures, the ethnic groups of the periphery struggled for a meaningful role in the mainstream politics of Pakistan. Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the severity of these demands was diluted through adjustments in the political landscape of Pakistan or through sub-nationalism within that particular province. For example, in 1973 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi, became the Prime Minister of the country after gaining an overwhelming majority of votes from Punjab in the 1970 general elections (Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League had obtained an overall majority, but the refusal of the Yahya Khan military dictatorship to transfer power to it precipitated the East Pakistan crisis, military crackdown, and the eventual parting of the ways with Indian help for East Pakistan to emerge as independent Bangladesh. The Pakistani military then installed Bhutto as a ‘majority’ seat holder on the basis of the general election in a united Pakistan!).
To alleviate ethnic grievances, eradicate the imprint of authoritarianism from the country’s Constitution and restore the country to a stable and consensual legal foundation, the then President Asif Ali Zardari formed a 27-member Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms, which drafted arguably the most significant changes in the 1973 Constitution. The most significant transformation was made in the relations between the Centre and the provinces. Previously, 45 percent of the divisible pool (including taxes) was allotted to the provinces, which was revised under the 7th National Finance Commission Award to 57.5 percent. Also, the inter-provincial distribution criteria were changed to include variables in addition to population size such as poverty ratio, inverse population density, etc. This decreased Punjab’s share by 5.6 percent and increased the shares of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. The sheer scale of the reform demonstrates that the 18th Constitutional Amendment was a landmark step towards addressing the relative deprivation of ethnic minorities and the articulation of their rights and interests. It also provided a constitutional safeguard for the allotted share of the smaller (in population) provinces.
Recent political developments in the country point to an expected Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) victory in the upcoming general elections (provided they are free and fair), with most opinion polls forecasting Imran Khan to be re-elected with a decisive 2/3rd majority. Such a scenario would further destabilise the country’s political landscape as Imran Khan’s party has publicly stated its desire to amend the Constitution to bring in a presidential system instead of the present parliamentary democracy. This follows the playbook of the Turkish premier Erdogan, who has steered the Turkish republic on the path of authoritarianism by adopting the Presidential model via a controversial referendum in 2017.
In his quest for unchecked and absolute political power, Imran Khan could seek to overturn the 18th Constitutional Amendment in order to radically reshape the state structure. The PTI chief may find the military establishment willing bedfellows in this endeavour as the powerful army has long viewed the 18th Amendment as a roadblock in its hegemonic designs.
The military establishment has its reasons for opposing decentralisation as ethnic minority groups like the Saraikis are capitalising on the political space gained post-18th Amendment to call for the creation of a Saraiki province. The military also fears that the creation of a Saraiki province on ethno-linguistic lines would result in a domino effect that will lead to the Hindko speakers in KP, Pashtuns in Balochistan and Urdu-speaking ‘Muhajirs’ in Sindh demanding separate provinces of their own. As the trauma of 1971 is still fresh in the minds of the Generals, they view the partition of provinces along ethnic lines with suspicion. In addition, as scholars like Katherine Adeney have argued, the creation of multiple new provinces comprising ethno-linguistic majorities would result in a consolidated electorate within the concerned provinces. This in turn would create obstacles for any kind of military-sponsored electoral engineering.
Historically, Pakistan has been administered on the lines of a centralised Punjabi-dominated federation with ethnic minorities concentrated in other provinces. In order to win over the Punjabi elite’s support for the 18th Amendment, they were assured that Punjab would be compensated through increased revenue transfers from the Centre. Even though the 18th Amendment was passed successfully with across-the-board political consensus, concerns remained that the Punjabi elite still remained in a position to manipulate its implementation due to their lion’s share in the state bureaucracy. To counter Punjabi dominance in the state apparatus, the partition of Punjab into smaller units has been proposed. However, political parties with a Punjabi political base have been resisting the move by terming it a conspiracy to divide the province’s populous vote bank. The opposition to the 18th Amendment can therefore be termed as a primarily Punjabi elite sentiment against the devolution of power. This opposition has been manifested by political parties popular in the province, namely the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and PTI.
Specifically, the PTI’s growing popularity in Punjab and its domination of the public discourse has resulted in opposition to the 18th Amendment enjoying resonance. During the party’s tenure in power in the federal government from 2018 till early 2022, it was not uncommon for PTI stalwarts to pin the blame for the bulk of Pakistan’s economic and administrative failures on the 18th Amendment. The 18th Amendment’s devolution of power principle was employed as an excuse to resist any further calls for decentralisation as unnecessary and excessive. As a result, the relative deprivation that formed the basis of ethnic unrest appears to linger, as the 18th Amendment faces renewed threats in the event of an expected PTI victory in the next general elections.
Ethnic minorities in Pakistan have the potential to counter the PTI-led popular narrative on the 18th Amendment. There is need of a grassroots movement by the non-Punjabi ethno-linguistic groups and the restructuring of public opinion in favour of a more inclusive federation. Pakistan’s ethnic conflicts trace their roots to a mismatch between its diversity and the centralised (Punjabi elite-dominated) character of its political institutions. Pakistan’s powerful ruling class was always reluctant to accept the pluralistic makeup of society and the 18th Amendment remains one of the few concrete legal steps taken by pro-democracy forces in recognition of the country’s diversity. The reversal of the 18th Amendment would irreversibly escalate tensions between the federal and provincial governments and potentially lead to renewed emergence of violent nationalist insurgencies.