My Life and Struggle – IV

General Elections 1970

Fayyaz Baqir

The NSO was jointly established by Azizuddin and Azizul Haq. The differences between them cropped up with reference to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). I will give my personal account of what I heard from them about the PPP, and what I saw as their point of disagreement. However, it is important to talk about the background of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s entry into popular politics in order to provide context to the division among Leftist groups about dealing with the PPP.

It is important to note here that in the 1960s Pakistan became a frontline state in the west’s cold war with the eastern bloc. The US established an airbase near Peshawar, and a spy plane taking off from this airbase for a spying mission to the USSR was shot down by the Soviets. This led to increased hostility between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. However, after the brief 1965 war with India, on the invitation of the Soviet leadership, General Ayub Khan agreed to have peace talks with the Indian Prime Minister (PM) Lal Bahadur Shastri in Tashkent. This annoyed US leaders and disappointed the Pakistani (especially Punjabi) masses, who were fed on highly exaggerated media hype during the 17-day war, making people believe that we are going to ‘Crush India’. Bhutto decided to part ways with Ayub at this critical juncture. Upon resigning from his post as Foreign Minister, he promised to disclose the ‘secret deal made in Tashkent’ – which he never did. He rode to popularity on the wave of anti-India public opinion and by adding his slogan of providing bread, clothing and shelter (Roti, Kapra aur Makan) for each Pakistani. He scaled unprecedented heights in a very short span of time. Some Leftist groups thought Bhutto was a CIA agent unleashed on Ayub to punish him for accepting Soviet-organised peace talks with India. Others were mesmerised by Bhutto’s miraculous success in making Socialism a household word in Pakistan.

Leftist groups – especially pro-Chinese Maoist groups – were divided on the question of the PPP. In principle all of them considered the PPP as their ally, and recognized Bhutto’s contribution in raising public consciousness. Bhutto in fact changed the rules of politics, successfully pulling it out of the drawing rooms to the streets, factories, fields and the public square. The general question was about the nature of an alliance with the PPP. It was considered to be a multi-class party led by the feudal elite; it had a reformist ideology dubbed as ‘Islamic Socialism’; it believed in the politics ‘of the ballot’, in contrast to the politics ‘of the bullet’ upheld by many Maoist groups. Yet at some point in the future the PPP risked being overthrown by military intervention, so banking on ballot politics could lead to a devastating result.

Specific questions about the alliance included the following: 1) should communist workers join the PPP, or should the PPP be used for harvesting communist cadre; 2) should Leftist groups accept offices in the PPP or cultivate PPP office bearers to join the ranks of communist groups, and 3) should the Left openly participate in a PPP election campaign or use this campaign to propagate communist ideology. It was crudely summed up as, “Should we use the PPP for our ends, or let the PPP use us for their ends?” There was a naïve confidence among many Leftist groups and leaders that we are ‘using’ the PPP to achieve our goals.

However, Dr Azizul Haq had one different concern. I met him with Manzur Ejaz at his residence a few months before the 1970 elections. He feared that Pakistan’s establishment might in panic decide to crush the socialist movement, and Pakistan might become a killing field. If that happens, it will be extremely demoralising. In his view it was the Left’s duty not only to join the PPP, but to save it from a fatal blow. He considered the mass movement unleashed by the PPP to be the most precious asset of the communists and must be saved. It did not mean a total collaboration, but a well-thought-out alliance. Professor Azizuddin had different views, which we will return to later.

PPP and the NSO

There were four openings for Leftist groups to make inroads into the PPP: 1) joining public rallies and meetings and raising revolutionary slogans to change the direction of PPP politics; 2) participating in the National Assembly (NA) and provincial Assembly election campaigns and winning the confidence of local candidates and voters, as well as identifying potential activists; 3) enrolling as a PPP member and campaigning in local party elections, and 4) cultivating party members and office bearers (and later on ministers), making an alliance with them to overpower the right wing faction of the PPP. Azizul Haq and Azizuddin agreed on points 1) and 2). Initially, Azizuddin as a matter of principle opposed point 2), but then left it to the discretion of NSO members to decide whether they wanted to participate in a local campaign or not. Both had no interest in point 3), and only Azizuddin pursued point 4).

On the question of participation in general elections, Azizuddin thought that we should stay away from bourgeois election politics, and Azizul Haq thought we should not be cut off from mass politics. In practical terms both agreed that student activists should infiltrate public rallies and meetings and raise their slogans to give political direction on class lines. I specifically remember a big procession on the Mall, Lahore, where we tried to raise the slogan: “Intikhab ya Inqilab, Inqilab, Inqilab” (Election or Revolution, Revolution, Revolution) in front of Bhutto’s truck to give the impression that it was the PPP’s party line. The PPP’s leadership very clearly knew its line of action. We also tried to raise another slogan – perhaps coined by Azizul Haq: “Cheen lo jageerain, Jageerain Cheen lo” (Confiscate the big tracts of land gifted by the British to their cronies). While communist workers wanted to propagate revolutionary ideas and demands through slogans and speeches, the PPP high command wanted people to see Bhutto as a Messiah and revolve around his charisma. While communists raised the slogan: “Jehra vahvey, ohee khavey, socialism avey hee aavey” (Land to the tiller, socialism is bound to come), the PPP stalwarts encouraged people to say: “Sada Bhutto avey he avey” (Our Bhutto is bound to come to power) or in the Siraiki area: “Bhutoo jeevey Sadar theevey” (Long live Bhutto, our President-to-be).

This method of influencing, or to put it bluntly ‘hijacking’ PPP politics, did not take the Left very far. It did not soften the grip of feudal lords on the party leadership. For people it was enough that Bhutto talked of “All Power to the People” (Taqat ka sarchashma Awam hain). The success of this politics of personality worship over ideological politics sidelined the Left in the public square.

I remember one of my dear friend Abid Ameeq’s poem in which a couplet said:

Nachtey hain khoob kis key gird chakkar bandh kar

Apney apney pait per sub log pather bandh kar.

(Who is the one around whom people dance in circles; the wretched ones who have tied stones to their bellies to subdue the pangs of hunger).

If a Marxist intellectual was so overawed by Bhutto’s charisma, one can imagine the impact leftist slogans would have on ordinary people. Later on, I will also describe Bhutto’s own reaction to these slogans during our truck ride with him in Multan.

Azizul Haq introduced me to another couplet (I don’t remember the name of the poet):

Khoon say bhi khaak par meri tasweer ban gayi

Lo kafiron ke des main bhi mojza huwa.

(My picture emerged from my blood spilled on the dirt, miracles can happen even in the land of non-believers).

In public however, Abid Ameeq’s sentiments dominated over Azizul Haq’s sentiment.

In later years we tried to raise quixotic slogans completely disregarding the local reality. During a big procession on the Mall, Zaman Khan (no offence meant to him as I was the one responding to his slogan) raised the slogan: “Tera Bari Mera Bari, Naxal Bari Naxal Bari” (Your village, my village, Naxal Bari, Naxal Bari). The slogan instantly died a natural death. Even within the NSO circle, very few knew about the Naxalite movement and Charu Majumdar or the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) at that time.

I remember in a mass rally in Multan when I raised the slogan “Naukar Shahi”, my dear friend and a PPP Chairman Shamsabad unit Salim Ullah Khan and his group answered with “Zindabad” (Long live). I was surprised and asked him why did he say Zindabad? He replied: “Because we want the government of servants.” Then I had to explain to him that although Naukar Shahi can mean government of servants (or the working class), in political jargon it means the Bureaucracy, and his response should not be “Zindabad” but “Murdabad” (Down with). At this point the head of any level of the PPP could use the title Chairman for himself. Later on, Bhutto kept this title only for himself, and other PPP office heads were called President.

While Bhutto was trying to drag politics out of the drawing rooms into the streets, communist intellectuals were in a hurry to push it from the street to aim at the army barracks through slogans. However, people were in no mood to abandon their newly won freedom and rush to overthrow a state by military means when the state was willing to hand over power to them through peaceful non-violent elections. As Professor Khalid Mahmood in his joyful and humorous mood once commented, “Asghar Khan is a great leader; he always says the right things – but at the wrong time.” Perhaps that was one of the dilemmas of the Left also. Bhutto was very good in dealing with such mistakes. He truly mastered the advice of Sun Tzu: “An army that knows how to advance and how to retreat can never be defeated.” That was the second dilemma of the Left, not knowing how to retreat wisely and gracefully. They could not even practice it internally. That is why the Leftist groups split into a multitude of small groups over the years, because sticking to a ‘politically correct line’ was more important to them than retreating and finding a common ground at a later stage. Bhutto in such situation could say, “Okay, if my view is not accepted, then Dama dam Mast Qalander” (Qalandar is in ecstasy and does not care about the consequences). Both Bhutto and Lin Piao mastered this art but lost the last final battle. The Pakistani Left is perhaps eons away even from producing a Deng Xiaoping.

Election Campaign for Bhutto in Multan

The second point listed above, of making inroads by Leftist groups, was participating in constituency campaigns of PPP candidates. Following the NSO decision to permit its members to participate in election campaigns of PPP candidates if they so desire, I decided to go back to my home town of Multan. Bhutto campaigned in the election from six constituencies in the 1970 elections, and Multan was one of them. His campaign headquarters was the residence of prominent lawyer Sahibzada Farooq Ali Khan. The NSO Multan unit decided to fully engage in Bhutto’s election campaign. Allah Nawaz Khan Durrani (President of the Student Union of Government College Multan), Tanveer Iqbal, Manzar Iqbal, Nasir Abbas, Maqsood Qureshi, Barkat Ali, Zahid Gilani and many other friends were part of this campaign. Pakistan has never seen an election campaign like this, before or after 1970. People donated their time, money, vehicles, food and drinks, and lavishly spent out of their pockets to make their dreams come true. Early in the morning we used to go to Sahibzada Farooq Ali’s residence, where a long line of rickshaws would be lined up. These rickshaws were fitted with battery operated loudspeakers. In each rickshaw two students would sit, taking turns to make speeches and raise slogans. Each one of us would be given a different route. I used to share a rickshaw with Zahid Gilani. We used to stop at important points. Public support for Bhutto was amazing; we were offered free tea, snacks and hospitality. It was a common sight to see an outpouring of sentiments by ordinary vendors, shopkeepers and workers. In response to an objection at one stop that Bhutto drinks, we saw a man dancing and chanting:

Bhutto Jeevey Saddar Theevey

Desi Chor Valayti Peevey.

(Long live Bhutto and may he become the President; Forget the home brewed wine, let him drink the imported stuff).

Finally, Bhutto won the election, and decided to visit Multan to thank the people of the city. Before the polls Bhutto had made a whirlwind visit of all the constituencies of Multan in support of his candidates. He did not spare even his close friend Hamid Raza Gilani, highly respected elder of the Gilani clan of Pirs, and made fun of him in his public rally saying: “Gilani Sahib, when you come to me you have a glass of wine in hand, when you come to your constituency you have rosary beads in hand; what is your truth?” He visited every constituency except Mumtaz Daultana’s constituency. The PPP had fielded Taj Langah against Daultana. Bhutto skipped it for two reasons; one, the Qureshis, who had seen the wind changing its direction, deserted Ayub Khan’s Convention Muslim League and decided to jump onto the PPP bandwagon. The Qureshis were traditional rivals of the Gilanis, so they pre-empted the Gilanis’ alliance with Bhutto, and wanted ‘communists’ like Mukhtar Awan and Langah out, and their candidates in. Two, Langah and Awan belonged to Mustafa Khar’s rival ‘communist’ faction in the PPP led by Sheikh Rashid, and they wanted them out as well. There was an attempt to revoke the ticket given to Mukhtar Awan for the provincial Assembly and bring in Makhdoom Sajjad Qureshi. This did not succeed but helped the Qureshis in dissuading Bhutto from visiting Taj Langah’s area, telling him there is no use in alienating Daultana if we are going to lose that seat anyway. Bhutto at this point did not expect more than 30 seats, so he wanted to keep the door open for an alliance with Daultana and wanted to oblige him by not visiting his constituency.

However, when the results were announced, the PPP had won a majority in Punjab, and Langah lost the seat by only 2,000 votes. Bhutto now repented his decision. He could have had another feather in his cap had he defeated Daultana. His visit would have had that impact. He wanted to compensate and console Langah. Bhutto had two extremely important concerns at this time: to keep the communists in and keep the feudals in as well. He knew that the Awami League (AL) had got a majority in Parliament and was in a position to form the government. If needing any allies, it would form an alliance with the National Awami Party (NAP). In that case many feudals in his party were likely to jump ship and join the AL bandwagon. So he wanted to get the NA session delayed to negotiate with Mujib for a share of power. This was his only chance. To delay the NA session, he needed to make a deal with Yahya Khan, and that is where he needed the communists. They could raise hell, and he could tell Yahya that if the military does not cooperate, the communists will be out of his control. When Yahya Khan tried to call the Assembly session, Mukhtar Rana started his Jalao Gherao Tehrik (burn and encircle movement) in Faisalabad and brought the whole city to a standstill. Bhutto also warned his members that if anyone dared to go to Dhaka to attend the session, he will break his legs. Ahmad Raza Kasuri was the only one who defied this stand in public, and we know what happened later.

On Bhutto’s arrival at Multan he had both these concerns in the back of his mind. He wanted to mend fences with Langah, and please the Qureshis as well. It is important to recall here that when Bhutto started his movement against Ayub Khan, he was attacked twice during his visit to Multan. During a public meeting at Qasim Bagh, a man carrying a knife tried to attack him, and student leader Manzoor (lamba) and others got hold of the attacker. On Bhutto’s visit to Khanewal, from Multan he travelled in a Volkswagen Beetle accompanied by Mir Rasul Bakhsh Talpur. His car was stopped by some musclemen at Kabirwala, and they punctured the tires with knives. Mir Talpur had very heavy moustaches and looked nothing less than a great feudal lord. As he came out the attackers ran away. Bhutto got wind that both these attacks were instigated by the Qureshis. Nawab Sadiq wanted to clear his position to avoid any future misunderstanding so in his meeting with Bhutto, he produced his henchman Razi Shah Gardezi and said, “Sir, people accuse me of planning the attack on you; actually, it was Razi Shah who did all this.” Bhutto was very sharp. He got the message and looking at Razi Shah replied, “We need brave people like you.” And he did.

On Bhutto’s arrival a truck was arranged for his city tour. He invited Khar and Langah to join him on top of the truck. Sahibzada Farooq knew that we were among the most active members of Bhutto’s campaign, so we were given charge of the truck on which Bhutto made his tour of the city, speaking, clapping and responding to the people. Our friend Nasir Abbas stood next to them to raise slogans. We had already briefed him to shout “Cheen lo Jageerain” and we’ll respond “Jageerain cheen lo”. To our surprise, after a couple of times he stopped raising these slogans. When we made faces at him, he pointed to Bhutto, indicating that Bhutto had stopped him. We did not believe him. So we raised the slogan from the back of the truck. This time Bhutto looked back and pointing his finger, stopped the guys raising the slogan. We were not ready to accept this, so I raised the slogan again at a high pitch. Bhutto looked back and spotted Manzar at the back of the truck. Thinking that he had defied his directive, he asked him to step down from the truck. All of us followed and left the truck.

In the evening some of our team members insisted that we meet Bhutto at the ‘White House’. This was Nawab Sadiq Qureshi’s residence and showed his deep respect and envy for the greatest symbol of power on earth. Bhutto agreed to meet us and have our photograph taken with him. As each one of us started introducing ourselves, Bhutto acknowledged with a nod until he got to the middle of the line and saw Manzar Iqbal. He stared at him for a few moments, but Manzar did not blink. Bhutto realized that the boy had strong nerves. Bhutto valued feudal lords for their vote bank and Leftists for their courage to defy and raise voices, and in some cases their brilliance of mind. He very affectionately said, “My son, you have to understand the delicacy of the political situation”, and then he moved to the next one in line. Bhutto made a speech at Sahibzada’s house the next day and assured the big landlords not to fear the PPP. He did not want to scare away the feudals who held many seats in the NA. To keep both feudals and Leftists in his fold he offered the former a share in power and the latter fulfillment of their dream of a socialist revolution – a moving truck’s rear light, an evasive promise, which many ‘revolutionaries’ are chasing to this day.

One of Bhutto’s immediate concerns was to put the genie of ‘power to the people’ back in the bottle as soon as possible after coming to power. That is why when the PPP government started a bloody operation against a worker’s strike in SITE, Karachi, led by Usman Baloch, Bhutto said in very clear terms: “The power of the street will be met by the power of the State.” Mairaj Mohammad Khan (declared as one of his successors during parleys with Yahya Khan) resigned as Minister of State for Labour after this event. Subsequently many of the Leftist ministers were co-opted, sidelined, or removed. As a strategic asset this ‘second opening’ also did not stay open for very long. People like Mukhtar Rana, who lent weight to Bhutto for his negotiations with the Army, disappeared from the scene. On the other hand, there were PPP leaders who naively believed that Socialism had already arrived. The PPP’s candidate for the provincial Assembly seat in Multan, Shaikh Akbar, was one of them. After Bhutto’s victory he commented: “Kvain they sosalism humari lashon pey avey ga ab sosalism to agiya hey vo lashain nazar neheen araheen” (Our opponents claimed that socialism – he was hinting at Jama’at-i-Islami, JI – can only succeed on their dead bodies; now socialism has arrived, but I don’t see any dead bodies).

During the election campaign I also accompanied the PPP’s nominee for the provincial Assembly, Riaz Qureshi, for his campaign. We were joined by the Brick Kiln Workers’ Union leader Rang Ali. He, like many other grassroots workers, was a brilliant guy and knew the language and thought pattern of the common people. During one of the visits an opponent taunted: “Under socialism they will nationalise your women.” Rang Ali retorted: “Our women are already nationalised (anyone can have access to them), under socialism your women will also be nationalised.” I cannot reproduce the exchange that went on in Saraiki. The guy shut his mouth and walked away.

Power of the street will be met by the power of the State

The PPP’s first phase of populist politics lasted only from 1968 to 1970. During this period the PPP made a four point declaration: 1) Islam is our religion; 2) Democracy is our politics; 3) Socialism is our economy, and 4) All Power to the People. In specifics it promised Roti Kapra aur Makan (bread, clothing and shelter) to the poor, and a 5.5 acre piece of land to peasants, sharecroppers and the landless. Before the promises of this phase could be fulfilled, a second phase of confronting street power with state power began. Different Leftist groups in Punjab responded differently to this political discourse. I would briefly like to digress to some of the key actions of this phase, and then go back to some of the events after the 1970 election. I will later on discuss each of the issues separately in order to present the Professor’s Groups’ and other groups’ stands on these key events, whether by design or default.

Bhutto insisted on and implemented the following: 1) If a meeting of the newly elected Assembly is held, the PPP will boycott it. No PPP MNA will be allowed to attend. When the Army operation in East Pakistan started, he welcomed it by saying, “Thank God, Pakistan has been saved.” He was the first and last civilian politician to accept the position of Deputy Martial Law Administrator to ‘save democracy and Pakistan’. This saving Pakistan business looked very much like the JI’s business to ‘Save Islam’. 2) After the separation of East Pakistan, he dismissed the provincial government of the NAP-JUI in Balochistan (the NAP-JUI government in North West Frontier Province, NWFP, resigned in protest in a show of solidarity with their Baloch comrades), and 3) started an Army operation in Balochistan to ‘Save Pakistan’. Then he carried out an Army operation in Dir. He accused the NAP of receiving arms and money from Iraq, and ‘recovered’ a cache of arms from the Iraqi Embassy. At this time a very interesting cartoon was published by the great Yusuf Lodhi (known as YL), where he showed Wali Khan, President of NAP, making a deal with Bhutto saying: “You stop telling the lies about us and we shall stop telling the truth about you.” 4) In the SITE and Dhabeji industrial areas police operations were launched in which a large number of workers were injured and killed. 5) Bhutto’s nationalisation programme was also in many ways a programme to encroach upon private power in order to consolidate State power. The nationalisation of schools, flour mills and rice husking mills can be best explained this way.

Power is very seductive. Bhutto took away the power of dissent, step by step, promising to give it back to people at some magical moment. People are still waiting for that moment. In the process he strengthened the State power so much that he became its victim. He rose with the cult of a warrior and ended with the cult of a martyr. That way he sanctified, institutionalised and perpetuated the helplessness of the people. This created room for corrupt elements to absolve themselves of all their responsibilities to the people, on the pretext of being ‘helpless’. Many opposition leaders were individually targeted, arrested, humiliated and killed. Leftist politicians were arrested in the Hyderabad Conspiracy case; dissenting leaders of his own party, like Mustafa Khar and Iftikhar Tari, were sent to the secret Dalai Camp to be kept in illegal confinement. Many workers were abducted, tortured and killed. This is when Arshad Mir wrote:

Kadam kadam per pehrey hain

Hakim goongay behray hain

Landhi or Korangi mein

Maut key saey gehrey hain

Dir Balochistan Jala

Aag mei her insaan jala

Vehshi Khoneen hathon mein

Poora Pakistan Jala

In Vehshi ghaddaron ko eik dhakka aur do

Girtti hoi dewaron ko ek dhakka aur do.

(There is a Police watch at every step; our rulers are deaf and dumb; shadows of death are hovering over the workers’ neighbourhoods of Landhi and Korangi; Dir and Balochistan are on fire; every human being got burnt in the hands of these beasts, entire Pakistan was burnt; push out these wild renegades, throw down these shaking walls).

All these actions were justified in the name of ‘unavoidable’ circumstances. It did not take long for people to see which way the wind was blowing. The NSO Multan unit started organising Peasant Committees in some of the surrounding villages. In one village Birhki, Comrade Chaudhry Nazeer Ahmad discovered a brilliant worker named Habibullah. Habibullah was trained as an activist by the Communist Party of India’s workers in Patiala during the pre-partition days. On my first meeting with him his question was:“Tuseen Kominisht ho?” (Are you a communist?). I asked him in return, “What do you mean by Kominisht?” He said, “Jo komaan which yaqeen naheen rakhday, kende nain komaan no nisht kar dio; is toon banya aye kominisht” (Those who do not believe in social discrimination, they tell you to demolish discrimination, from this has come the word communist). I said, “Yes.” As we walked through the field a JI worker taunted:“Habibullah, what happened to your PPP?” He was of course referring to the promise of distribution of 5.5 acres to landless families. There was no sign that this promise would ever see the light of day. Habibullah’s answer was classic: “Bola anhee noon dhrui phirda aye, ohnoon sunda kuch naheen, sanoon disda kuch naeen” (A deaf man is leading a blind woman; he cannot hear, and we cannot see the way). That is why Mao Tse Tung said, “If people don’t have a party, they don’t have anything.” The question for the Left was whether to embrace the PPP as their party, as an ally, or as a bourgeois party. Leftist groups kept changing their relationship with the PPP over the passage of time. However, Azizul Haq took a very principled stand on almost every occasion, although one can disagree with his style of work. I want to conclude my comments on the Left-PPP partnership in the next section, with special reference to the Professors’ Group (PG).

Army action in East Pakistan

For NAP President Wali Khan, opposing the Army action was simply a question of respecting democratic norms and the majority decision. NAP East Pakistan’s leader Maulana Bhashani had already seen the turn of the tide and in an open letter said goodbye to Pakistan, declaring: “History is with me.” Azizul Haq saw it as a continuation of the National Liberation Movement of Bengal, with deep roots in Bengali history going back to Titoo Mir Shaheed and other Bengali rebels. He considered it the duty of every revolutionary, especially Punjabis, to publicly condemn the Army action and support the Bengalis. And he did. Under his leadership the Young People’s Front’s (YPF’s) Shuja ul Haq and Javed Ali Khan made speeches on a megaphone outside Bhati Gate, Lahore in support of the Bengalis, and were thrashed by the audience. Public opinion in Punjab was misinformed and chauvinistic. In private Punjabis took pride in the looting and plundering of Pakistani troops in East Pakistan and the rape and disgrace of Bengali women. The PG saw the mass movement in East Pakistan as a ‘separatist bourgeois movement’ not worthy of any sympathy; they considered the territorial integrity of the State of Pakistan as their prime concern, a stand supported in principle by Panj Sheela and the Chinese Communist Party.

I recall my visit to Daily Musawaat’s office with Khalid Mahmood, when we saw NSO’s Maoist supporter poet Talib Jallundhry coming out. His face was lit up. In his humble style he said, “Meray Aqaa (My Lord), I have just given a poem to Musawaat in praise of the Pakistan Army. Why shouldn’t we support an army which is supported by the Chinese leadership?” We were stunned to hear this logic. The PG’s stand was much closer to the stand of the PPP and the army. The PPP later made General Tilkka Khan – who led the Army operation in its early stages – its General Secretary. Due to intense disagreement in the PG on this issue, a meeting was held in Tariq Lateef’s house in F Block Model Town. It was agreed that in this bourgeois conflict the PG would neither support Mujib nor the Pakistan army but would demand the peaceful transfer of power and an end to the Army action. Leftist groups were divided on this issue. Some sided with the NAP and Azizul Haq’s views, and others with the PPP and PG. Faiz Sahib wrote his famous poem, “Hum Ke Thehre Ajnabi itni Mulaqaton ke Ba’ad” (We who turned into strangers after so many intimate encounters).

From then onwards, Azizul Haq openly opposed the PPP leadership’s highhandedness. His whole group participated in Zarina Rana’s election campaign after her firebrand revolutionary brother Mukhtar Rana was forced to vacate his seat as member of the NA by the PPP leadership. Sadly, Azizul Haq was killed at the end of this campaign, and the YPF fizzled out.

Army action in Balochistan

After the ‘action’ in East Pakistan, Bhutto launched the Army action in Balochistan to ‘Save Pakistan’ again. A Hyderabad Conspiracy Case was ‘discovered’, and various progressive leaders ranging from the NAP to Leftists and some of the underground armed resistance Balochistan People’s Liberation Front’s (BPLF’s) cadres were all arrested and jailed. The Punjabi Left, including the PG, again had a mixed and subdued response. By that time, I had left the PG and joined Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP). The question that bothered me was why all those groups that plan to bring revolution through the barrel of a gun don’t join the Baloch. When I asked Imtiaz Alam why MKP does not join the Baloch, he said,“We shall play a much bigger role; the Baloch have only 5,000 guns, whereas MKP has 8,000 guns in NWFP. We have to wait for the right moment.” That moment never arrived. It is ironic that according to Baloch sources, not a single Pakhtun joined them, unlike many UK-returned Punjabis who stood shoulder to shoulder with them. It is hard to verify the authenticity of Imtiaz’s statement. I remember Maulana Bhashani had declared in the Toba Tek Singh Kissan Conference in 1970: “Yahya Khan if you don’t accept our demands, we shall wage an armed struggle against you. We have 42,000 guerillas under our command.” In politics many times it is difficult to separate illusion from reality. This has happened perhaps more frequently in Pakistan than in other places.

The Left had two more openings to collaborate with the PPP, joining the party or the government. The PPP had held elections for electing party office bearers in its early days. This had provided one opportunity for giving power to the people. After coming to power Bhutto started nominating party office bearers himself, and this door for sharing power was closed. With all power for the nomination of party office bearers and candidates in party elections vested in the high command, the foundation for dynasty politics was laid and the power of the street was effectively checked. Bhutto dismissed even his own Governor Mustafa Khar, as well as his close provincial ministers, and kept them in illegal confinement at Dalai Camp. No Leftist group could lay its hands on any important position in the party after this.

At the government level the NSO kept an alliance with the Sheikh Rashid group in the PPP for some time, but very early in the game the PPP turned its back on its working class constituency. The PPP made very strategic use of the Left’s assets of street power, voice of courage and utopian dreams to negotiate a better share of power with the army. Due to the Left’s inherent weaknesses, it could not derive any long term benefits from its partnership with the PPP. The Left’s leaders did not build any insider network in the ‘bourgeois’ power circles to draw insider information, it did not develop an in-depth understanding of political interests at the national and international level and could not go much beyond slogans and clichés.

I would like to close this chapter with a story about Mairaj Mohammad Khan narrated to me by Agha Khalid Saeed, who had heard it from the horse’s mouth. Bhutto was very fond of Mairaj due to his courage, experience in agitational politics and fiery speeches. He considered him a staunch anti-imperialist, was aware of his contempt for knowledge of bourgeois politics, and always motivated him to read. When he started negotiations for acquiring a nuclear reprocessing plant from France, he was very excited that this might help Pakistan build its nuclear programme. In confidence he said to Mairaj: “Mairaj, reprocessing plant la raha hoon” (I am bringing the reprocessing plant). Mairaj spontaneously said, “Pehley aap roti plant bhi to laye thay” (First you brought the roti – bread – plant too). It was like throwing a bucket of cold water on a sizzling Bhutto. He said in reprimand: “Mairaj tumhain kitni bar kaha hay parha karo” (Mairaj, how many times have I told you, read).

Cyclone in East Pakistan

Before the General Elections in 1970 a big cyclone hit East Pakistan. General Yahya Khan’s government announced postponing the elections. The elections were postponed on the pretext of having limited administrative capacity during the rescue efforts for the large number of people dislocated in the coastal areas. Mujibur Rehman’s AL suspected a conspiracy by the military regime to continue its hold on power in the name of rescue efforts. The political atmosphere heated up. The NSO as a matter of policy opposed the AL’s politics based on Bengali nationalism. The NSO also did not want to be seen as a supporter of the military rule. From the NSO’s point of view, the election of any government championing the cause of oppressed nationalities within the existing class system was part of bourgeois politics. However, the NSO could not stay silent on a major natural catastrophe and the heating political climate. Thus, the NSO leadership decided to hold big public meetings to express solidarity with the victims of the cyclone, as well as state its position on the elections, the AL, the Army and the class system, and convey its message for revolutionary change.

A huge rally was held at Punjab University New Campus for this purpose. The immediate objective of this rally was to express solidarity with the Bengali students. They were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the government’s policy and concerned about the situation back home. They held a hunger strike to press their political demands, and the NSO fully supported them. Emotional speeches by NSO leaders created a wide circle of sympathisers for the NSO. Many students were touched by NSO’s idealism and offered their appreciation and support for the NSO’s work. Years later the NSO, during the PPP’s rule, participated in relief work for the people affected by floods in the River Ravi. Relief work was not part of the NSO’s policies, but ineffective handling of the natural disaster by the government was used to expose class discrimination and the limitations of the class system. Inept handling of natural disasters was used as an opportunity to expose the incompetence, corruption and biases rooted in Pakistan’s administrative system and give a call to the students to raise their voice against it. The AL also made the best use of the cyclone to build the sentiments of the Bengalis against the political discrimination and deprivation visited on them. The natural cyclone was followed by a political cyclone, resulting in a verdict of complete distrust in the Punjabi leadership. Public opinion split along regional lines, and no last minute effort could restore the confidence of the Bengalis in a system that failed them again and again.

Slogans, posters and wall-chalking were part of our campaign to create awareness about the plight of the Bengalis. Literary and artistic narration is a powerful tool for political propaganda, and the AL also used it to its advantage very effectively. The AL’s General Secretary in one of his speeches told his audience: “Our capital Islamabad is a beautiful city. Its roads shine like glass. During one of my visits, I was so mesmerised by the magic of these roads that in complete awe I decided to kiss the road. As I bowed down to kiss, I was amazed to discover that the roads smelt of jute.” He was referring to the foreign exchange earned by exporting jute being used for providing luxury to the ‘Punjabis’ and handing out the harvest of hunger to the Bengalis.

We also used art as an important political tool. During the 1973 floods Mian Ijaz ul Hasan designed a great poster for the NSO saying: “A flood is not the wrath of God, but a curse of the class system.” This poster was displayed all over the educational institutions in Lahore. Our liberal friends at times used to crack jokes on what they saw as our farfetched interpretation of events. I remember a friend telling me, “I saw your poster today, it was very impressive, but what was it about? It said a flood is the result of water’s class struggle!”

Mian Ijaz ul Hasan designed many fantastic posters for the NSO’s propaganda campaigns. One such poster was about American aid to Pakistan. Ijaz masterly played on the original American aid poster designed by USAID. That poster showed two hands in a warm handshake, one with the American and the other with the Pakistani flag on its sleeve. In Ijaz’s poster blood drops were shown dripping down from the Pakistani hand. That was a very powerful statement. No words were needed to say anything more. Ijaz designed another classic poster on the US massacre in My Lai in Vietnam. These posters gave a larger than life presentation to NSO’s propaganda work. A collection of Ijaz’s posters would provide an eloquent presentation of the NSO’s narrative in 1970s student politics.

Toba Tek Singh Kissan Conference

The year 1970 was a milestone in the electoral politics of Pakistan. This was the first time that free and fair general elections were held based on adult franchise, and a military government fulfilled its promise of holding elections on time. The stage was set for a showdown between religious and secular/socialist parties. Pakistan’s ruling elite started beating the drum of religion to prevent its defeat. They generously funded religious parties to declare their secular opponents ‘enemies of Islam’ and seek votes in the name of ‘saving Islam’. Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) was the only exception. JUI sided with the progressive forces and opposed this reactionary interpretation of Islam. Many prominent events built up public opinion in favour of a progressive, democratic Pakistan. Secular parties won a stunning victory in the 1970 elections. Religious and conservative parties and traditional religious leaders were routed. The AL won a majority based on its seats in East Pakistan; the PPP won in Punjab and Sindh, and the NAP-JUI in NWFP and Balochistan. The people of Pakistan gave a clear mandate to secularism, democracy and a welfare state. The war won by the people was lost by their leaders. We still keep reminding people of the Quaid’s August 11, 1947 speech to score a point for secularism but never care to analyse how the secular leadership itself strangulated the politics of secularism. How Mr Bhutto unleashed the army on the Bengalis and the Baloch, and how the PPP laid the foundations for the Mujahideen and Taliban outfits.

In the days leading up to the election, big mass rallies, demonstrations and marches were held. One of the historical events was the Kissan Conference held in Toba Tek Singh. The Conference was organised by the NAP-Bhashani group. Speakers included Maulana Bhashani, Matiurrehman, Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Tariq Aziz and many others. There were many poets in attendance also. It was perhaps Ghiasuddin Janbaz who said:

In dinon Peking se barh kar hey Toba Tek Singh (Toba Tek Singh has gone a step ahead of Peking these days).

JI and other right wing parties started a full throttle propaganda campaign against socialist ideas. They called socialists harbingers of an imported ideology. Maulana Bhashani was called Mao Lana Bhashani (meaning the one who wants to bring Mao, unlike the traditional meaning: our leader and guide) by one right wing journal. Hundreds of thousands of jubilant political workers, labourers, peasants and students attended the conference. People travelled in trains, buses, bikes and on foot to the venue of the Conference. The NAP and PPP flags and red flags with hammer and sickle were fluttering everywhere. A big contingent of NSO members and Bengali students boarded a train from Lahore to Toba Tek Singh. There were slogans on the walls saying Chalo Chalo Toba Chalo (Come, come, let us go to Toba). NSO members included Khwaja Tariq Masood, Tariq Latif, Zaman Khan, Jahangir, myself and many others. Bengali students kept raising the slogans Shangram, Shangram, Chol Bey, Chol Bey (Struggle, Struggle, will continue, will continue), Amar Naita, Tumar Naita, Maulana Bhashani (Our leader, your leader, Maulana Bhashani) and Maulana Bhashani Lal Salam, Lal Salam (Red Salute to Maulana Bhashani). We met Shahid Nadeem and many other progressive friends upon arrival at Toba. Many other student and trade union delegations came from other parts of Punjab. As we got off the train and moved towards the big tent, we saw a big crowd of PPP workers dancing in a circle to a drum beat around their flag. I noticed a tall, young, handsome man in the middle. I asked someone who this guy was. “Ahmad Raza Kasuri,” was the reply. Many other PPP leaders and groups joined.

The meeting started with a big fanfare. There were many fiery speeches and poems. I especially noted three speeches. Tariq Aziz, who was a close comrade of Mairaj Mohammad Khan at that time and a follower of Maoist thought said, “Punjab needs to break Ranjha’s flute and pick up Mirza’s arrow” to fight against tyranny and exploitation. It was time to rise in arms against the decadent and exploitative system that had sucked the blood of the working classes for many generations. There was a big round of applause as it reflected public sentiment. It seemed that the inspiration of all the speakers was: ‘Revolution grows out of the barrel of a gun’. Then came the NAP General Secretary Masihurrehman, who in a roaring voice said, “Yahya Khan, tum Ghaddar hey Ghaddar Hey” (Yahya Khan, you are a traitor, a traitor). Such a display of defiance and courage was mind boggling. These speeches took the level of popular emotions to the seventh sky. Masihurrehman was later on arrested on charges of treason. His defence was very simple. He said he did not have full command over the Urdu language and did not understand the meaning of the word Ghaddar. So, he picked a wrong word. Case dismissed. Maulana Bhashani made a very fiery speech and told Yahya Khan that the NAP had 42,000 guerillas in East Pakistan and if the army did not accept his party’s demands, he would launch guerilla warfare. It heated the blood of everyone in the audience. There were marches and dances and celebrations in the evening. The small town of Toba Tek Singh ran out of booze due to the heavy attendance of men with cozy hearts. Something similar happened later in Lahore at the time of the Islamic Conference.

The Kissan Conference was a unique show of the Left’s unity and solidarity in Punjab and a display of its mass power. Something like this never happened before or after this event. The proceedings of the Toba Tek Singh Conference got good press coverage and generated discussion on class politics all over Pakistan. The NAP-Bhashani Group had no leader with the stature of Bhashani in West Pakistan, so this event did not help the NAP-Bhashani gain any electoral benefits from this Conference, but it brought the issues of peasants’ exploitation to the centre stage of Pakistan’s politics. Maulana Bhashani was perhaps the only national level leader who dressed like the peasants and had a peasant origin with remarkable leadership qualities. This was perhaps his last public speech in a united Pakistan.

(To be continued)