Volume 8, No. 8, August 2026
Editor: Rashed Rahman
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While Pashtuns and Baloch have had a similar history and experience with regards to atrocities committed against them by the state, their movements have taken different paths. This section seeks to understand the different underlying themes of nationalism, religion and political and economic representation that must inform any analysis of the two movements.
From Ayub Khan to Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s army elite has tried to forcefully promote a united country, favouring military action over political solutions to squash any separatist tendencies. Such a policy has only reinforced these sentiments. Former President ZiaulHaq was once quoted as saying he would “ideally like to break up the existing provinces and replace them with 53 small provinces, erasing ethnic identities from the map of Pakistan altogether”.26
As Urdu was linked to the ideology of Muslim separatism and was projected as a major symbol for national integration, it made language an identity symbol for ethno-nationalists. Ethnic groups in East Pakistan, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP have reacted by consolidating their identity, of which language is a defining aspect.The Bengali and Sindhi language movements have been violent. The ethnic tensions between the Urdu-speaking Mohajir and Sindhi speakers – manifesting in language riots and the splitting of Sindh’s provincial quota into Urban and Rural in 1972-73 – planted the seeds for the creation of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in the 1980s. While groups have asserted their ethnic identity in the form of language, the Pashtun have been different. The Pashto language movement has decreased in intensity because the Pashtuns have integrated themselves in the mainstream to a certain degree, joining the army and bureaucracy in fairly large numbers.27
The division of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in 1971 shattered the myth that being Muslim was enough to unite the nation. Despite that, leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s and Zia in the 1980s continued the policy of sectarianism and ‘divide and rule’. Rather than creating a national consciousness, however, the aggressive promotion of the Urdu language and Muslim identity became one of the major causes of the ‘Talibanisation’ of the western border; it would drive the security establishment’s obsession with being anti-India. The Pakistan state’s quest for homogeneity created further faultlines within society and contributed to the emergence of radical Islamic groups across the country.
Pakistan’s ethno-nationalists have all demanded greater political, economic and cultural autonomy for their group and region. Pashtun nationalists have tried to unite people on a more inclusive basis than tribalism. The call to create an independent Pashtun homeland (Pashtunistan) for all Pashtuns irrespective of tribal affiliations/groupings and including Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line had been a persistent feature of their politics, although it had since declined. While parties such as the Awami National Party (ANP), which represents Pashtun interests, and the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) (which represents Pashtuns in Balochistan) have amassed support, their ability to form government has been controlled by other groups such as JUI-F and other national parties. This is similar to 1947 when the Muslim League or the idea of a nation based on Islam overwhelmed Ghaffar Khan’s movement to create a Pashtun country.
During the Afghan jihad, with the proliferation of madrassas, Islamists wanted to change the local Pashtun population’s tribal affiliation into religious affiliations, as Islam was the ‘tool’ used to fight the Soviets. Militants targeted tribal maliks, resulting in the collapse of the traditional tribal system. By eliminating the most powerful tribal leaders, the mullahs filled the political vacuum by providing religious motivation to the militants.
The British policy towards the Pashtun rested on identifying and ranking tribes in relation to one another, to determine which group was most strategically important over which region, and which sub-tribes relied on them, allocating allowances and subsidies on this basis. Years later, Pakistan identified Pashtuns and tribes based on whether or not they could forge a resistance to the Soviet invasion. By investing in the ‘idea of the tribe’, the military designed policies where Pashtuns were motivated by religion and directed by tribal, cultural and religious principles.28Although FATA was severely underdeveloped even before the rise of militancy, the decades of government neglect, archaic FCR laws and lack of investment in the region allowed a black economy and violence to flourish. As a result, military campaigns in the region after 2001 left residents more vulnerable to militant recruitment. While the government could have won over people’s hearts and minds and curbed extremism through institutional, political and economic changes to governance, it chose instead to empower those that would do its bidding and further alienate a majority of the population.29Therefore, while jihad initially helped suppress the Pashtun sentiments in the larger cause of jihad, it did not eliminate them.30The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) is a prime example of how ethnic nationalism in Pakistan continues to evolve today. The destruction of the tribal structures as a result of religious indoctrination and military campaigns has caused Pashtuns to seek a reversal of their fortunes and return to a time where their lives were governed by their tribal customs.
In Balochistan, the Pakistan government continues through the Ministry of Religious Affairs to set up madrassas to penetrate deeper into the Baloch areas that are opposed to the mullah. By harnessing the growing power of the clergy, they have manipulated elections, enabling religious parties such as JUI-F to form the government. The rationale behind this policy is two-fold: the state assumes that this is the best way to entrench Islamic thought into society, engrain it amongst the Baloch so as to subdue their nationalist and separatist aspirations; the second is to propagate a disinformation campaign that equates Baloch resistance with Islamic terrorism. Pakistan intelligence services have linked nationalist militarism in the state to the terrorism of al Qaeda and the Taliban, while ironically, Baloch insurgents taking refuge in Afghanistan, sided with communist forces.31
Historical circumstances and social organisation of the Pashtun and Baloch have propelled their members along different routes to mobilisation. Neither route is entirely exclusive of the other. In post-colonial Balochistan, the Baloch have followed a predominantly political route while the Pashtun have followed an economic route to mobilisation. The Baloch mobilisation has been of a political nature primarily due to the institution of the sardar in Baloch society and its tendency to create dynamic leaders at an ethnic-national level. Through the years a number of sardars have entered politics, aiming to convert their tribal standing into political power.There has been no sincere effort or political will on the part of the British or the Pakistani state to change or curb the power of the sardar. As a sardar’s main interest remained in consolidating their land, the British focused on buying their loyalty, making them extensions of British authority in their particular region. This gave the British and later the Pakistani state indirect access over the natural resources in their territory. As the leader of his tribe, the sardar often acted against the interests of his people, accepting British financial assistance in exchange for submission to their authority. This policy has not only strengthened the sardari system over the years, it also inhibited the growth of a pan-sardar solidarity.32 Different Baloch leaders have set up tribal guerillas and fighters in their territory, some to resist, others to help the British, then to fight Pakistan over the years. Bugti, Mengal and Marri were the principal tribal chiefs in open rebellion against the government. They have all led forces of thousands of loyalists: the Marri tribe formed the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA); Ataullah Mengal, leader of the Baloch National Movement (BNM), which merged into the Balochistan National Party (BNP), and the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), which has ties to the Bugti tribe. The leaders have remained divided across the political-ideological spectrum on how to deal with the Pakistani state. During the 1990 interim elections, Bugti split from the others, forming the JWP, which made an alliance with Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N. This has been a trend ever since, of factional rivalries leading to Baloch groups making alliances with national parties. In 1991, Mengal and the BNP formed a coalition with the support of the PPP and in 1996 Zulfikar Magsi formed a government with the support of the PPP, PML-N and JUI-F. In 2010, after political lobbying and much struggle, the 18th Amendment to the Pakistan Constitution was passed under the PPP government, whereby NWFP was renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), in an effort to assuage the Pashtuns. It comprised seven agencies and 28 districts, and the tribal areas of FATA were merged into the newly renamed KP.
Baloch ethnic identity gained greater importance in the post-colonial era because of resource competition with the Pashtuns. While this is partly because of the influx of Pashtun refugees fleeing the war in Afghanistan, it is important to recognise the legacy of the colonial era. While Balochistan remained poorer than any Pakistan region, the northern Pashtun areas achieved a greater deal of economic progress. This is partly due to the British construction of road and railway routes through the frontier region towards Afghanistan. As trade and troops flowed through the new routes, larger population centres grew. While there was economic development and new towns were being built along the railway lines in the south as well, the colonial development of the region favoured the Pashtun population in the north, more than the Baloch in the south.33 In the Pashtun areas of Balochistan, there is evidence of economic success. Straddled across the Durand Line, Pashtuns have for generations controlled important trade and smuggling routes. Relative to the Baloch, they have been successful in professions such as transportation and construction. Given their historical ties to various regimes in northern India, the Pashtuns have developed networks and skills that have given them access to economic markets in Pakistan.
The Baloch have felt a strong sense of political deprivation due to their underrepresentation and underemployment at the federal level. They have felt much more alienated from the Punjabi establishment than have the Pashtuns. The perception is that the Punjabis, who dominate the state apparatus and representative institutions like the military and civil bureaucracy, look down on them as ‘primitive’, while favouring the Pashtuns.34 Historically, the bulk of the Pakistan army has comprised Punjabis (70-75 percent), Pashtun (15-21 percent), with a small proportion of Sindhis and Mohajirs (3-5 percent) and Baloch (0.3 percent).35 In addition, Pashtuns are well represented in all strata of the capitalist class, having established businesses in all provinces; in contrast, there is no significant Baloch capitalist class.36
Conclusion
There is an oft-quoted way of describing the British colonialists’ approach to the historical ethnic tapestry in what is now Pakistan: “Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pashtun and befriend the Baloch.” While it may have been a truism of how the British empire viewed the region, it also encapsulates the way the nation-state that is Pakistan has chosen to deal with the different ethnic groups within its territory.
Security experts are keeping a watchful eye on Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan, given the potential for conflict in the region. After all, the tribal systems and culture of the Pashtuns of FATA have been irrevocably damaged, they continue to be economically deprived, and the military forces have them in a chokehold. The Pashtuns are left with few options. The loss of their homes, families, traditions and normalcy has not only pushed Pashtun society even further backwards, but has left them with no trust in the Pakistan government. External pressure on the tribal leaders has had no effect that is remotely beneficial to the state. It has instead forced the Pashtuns to take up arms, first against Pakistan’s enemies in Afghanistan and then against Pakistan itself. The rise and growth of the PTM threatens the Pakistan state, given its non-violent and democratic nature. It will take Pakistan nothing less than urgent, far-reaching steps to make amends for decades of brutality against the Pashtuns: restoration of the tribal structures; removal of arbitrary checkpoints; a return of those who have been taken by state forces without a trace, and a cessation of the military policy in the region.
In Balochistan, while the Baloch leaders make alliances for their own political and financial benefit, the people of the province are suffering and continue to be repressed. There is minimal representation of the people and there is a need for a drastic political change that takes into account the voices on the ground. Intra-Baloch rivalry, compounded by the paranoia of its leaders, has stunted Baloch politics. While the potential of a pan-Baloch party cannot be ruled out, the military’s meddling in electoral politics dampens hopes of real change in the grassroots. As projects under CPEC continue, there is the potential for a grassroots movement similar to PTM to emerge that will fight for adequate and fair representation in the government and development projects in the province.
Endnotes:
(Concluded)