Political Narrative of Pakistan: Problems, Costs, Challenges

S Zulfiqar Gilani

Since the birth of Pakistan in August 1947, there has been contestation around its political narrative. However, there is an official narrative that has dominated and underpins a certain political order. In this essay the genesis and evolution of the dominant political narrative as well as the recent challenge to it will be examined. Very briefly, the official narrative defines Pakistan as an Islamic (Military) Security State, which has had critical ramifications for the architecture of power and politics. That narrative is used as a tool to maintain the status quo and protect the vested, especially financial, interests of the ruling cabal. Its important fallouts include the distortion and subversion of the political process, ascendance of an anti-democratic, anti-people and inhuman political order, and fracturing of the social contract and community. Finally, the narrative has been artificially crafted at the top and imposed by the unfettered and brutal use of the power of state machineries.

As the dominant narrative did not emerge from a political struggle, it is in important ways detached from historical and contextual reality and based on history-distorting mendacity, which in certain aspects is plain delusional. In a word the dominant narrative is false. Further, and perhaps most importantly, the political order that stands on this narrative has failed to contribute to the improvement in the lives of ordinary people. Rather, it has perpetuated untold and unaccountable advantages for the few. Therefore, the official narrative has poor popular appeal and has been variously challenged, which has been dealt with brutal oppression with high and long-lasting damage. Nevertheless, over the relatively recent past a strong and substantive challenge has been gelling that has progressively exposed the falsity of the official narrative and the farcical nature of the associated political order. That however is again being dealt with with even greater brutality, with the (insane) assumption that actions that have caused so much destruction and grief in the past will somehow have different consequences this time.

To make the examination more substantive and meaningful, a brief digression into generic characteristics of narratives is in order. Narratives are an integral aspect of the human experience, discernible worldwide, and our ability to make and tell stories or narratives is what makes us human and helps give meaning to deal with loss, pain, and suffering. Their meanings or moral lessons are potentially humanity-wide, and constraints on commonality are linguistic, cultural and historical. Biological, cultural, historical and social resources are drawn upon for narratives. They have intentionality and hence an ethical dimension, and thus enable constructing meaning and organising experience, rather than mere information-sharing. They are ways of presenting or understanding of situations or a series of events that reflect and/or promote a particular point of view or set of values. Although narratives usually refer to individuals and events, their greater significance is description of the context and situations in which the individuals exist and events occur. They are situated in time, have causal unity in the sequence of events, and a beginning and an end. Further, narratives are often non-linear. So, while it is in the interest of officialdom to promote a decontextualised linear conception of time, past experiences constantly reappear in the present, often without notice, and disrupt the official conception.

Narratives are essential because although an outer reality exists that to some degree impacts and constrains our cognition, outer reality is not directly knowable. It is by means of narratives that an understanding of the outer reality develops by retrospective interpretation and in terms of future goals. By organising memories, narratives bring the past to the present, and as well make possible a meaningful vision of the future. However, the description of the world in the narrative cannot have a one-to-one correspondence to the real world out there, which is experienced as messy, undisciplined, unfocused, and with unclear purpose.

Narratives are complexly enmeshed with cultures, societies and individuals. The meanings, intents and moral bases for events encapsulated in narratives are in turn entwined with social settings as well as individual emotions, thinking and behaviour. Culturally available and shared narratives play an important role in shaping individual feelings, thinking, perception, imagination and moral choices, but in a world of possibilities rather than certainties. Although they reflect the moral basis of human affairs, they also reveal that moral values are not absolute, are complicated and negotiated, and ultimately political. That is, there is always reference to a truth or truths in a narrative both in factual and fictional accounts, but they are presented not as absolutes but as culturally, socially, and politically complicated. It is possible to have several different versions of the same narrative, around which there is socio-cultural negotiation that depends on the context and the people involved. Further, a narrative may undergo transformations over time, which are caused by non-ordinary events where some of the participants react in an emotionally intelligent manner to the situation and can articulate, symbolise, and champion transformed or different narratives and actions that are purposeful.

As the subjectivities (experiences, emotions and personal perspectives) of the actor/s and narrator/s are included in narratives, they blur the distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity and the false binaries of objective/subjective or insider/outsider. The appeal of a narrative is a function of how well it connects with experiences and feelings, rather than with pure logic and rationality: And experiences and feelings are personal, which unfold in relation to history and community. Guided more by feelings and intuition than logic or scientific empiricism, narratives enable flexible and adaptive functioning in a messy, confusing and uncertain world. Finally, narratives are not the sole province of scholars or professionals or officialdom, rather they belong to everyone, and their appeal cannot be dictated or imposed.

The political creation-narrative of Pakistan was encapsulated in the Two Nation theory, which emphasised the Muslim/Islamic identity of the new country. However, the emphasis was on what we were not (Indians/Hindus), rather than what we were. The Two-Nation theory was articulated in the Objectives Resolution (OR) of March 1949. (The OR subsequently became the preamble of the 1956, 1962 and 1973 Constitutions, the last one of which is still in force, at least de jure). The somewhat simplistic logic was that that narrative would appeal to most in a Muslim majority country and unify diverse cultures, political narratives, and histories. Combine that with the fact that the Muslim League, which was the flagbearer for the creation of Pakistan, was only marginally involved in the liberation struggle against the British, and that also only in some geographical spaces in what was to constitute Pakistan. Therefore, the narrative had shallow political roots and its appeal was patchy. Thus, when Pakistan as a state was established in August 1947, the national identity narrative was contested and the battle over it dominated the political arena for many years, which, though now under the carpet, still remains unresolved.

The Islamic identity narrative was weaponised by flagging the existential threat from India, and the need for ‘liberating’ the area of Kashmir that India controlled. Thus, very soon the Islamic identity narrative became the Islamic (military) security narrative. However, there was the reality of the existing strong sub-national and local narratives, identities, and histories. So, the official narrative was perceived and experienced as alien, hegemonic and homogenising. Nevertheless, the official narrative was considered sacrosanct, and there was a strong push from officialdom that it be accepted without question. The argument being that only the official narrative ensures the continued existence of the country. In addition, it served the purpose of allocating disproportionate resources to the military, and the establishment and maintenance of a certain political order and the status quo. And as well it defined a ‘good’ citizen or member of society.

The official narrative and its pragmatic fallouts disrupted the political process. And there was resistance, which was especially strong in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), but also discernible to varying degrees in all other provinces except the Punjab. There was either incapacity to recognise the dangers and potential damage of the authoritarian imposition of the official narrative and disruption of the political process, or it was just ignored, or both. Instead, challenges were addressed by progressively increasing the intensity of enforcement and enfeebling alternative narrative/s and dissident political voices through marginalisation or repression by brute force. In the process, the army gained overwhelming (umpiring) dominance in determining what political narrative, and who, was ‘acceptable’, and only those adhering to it were allowed to participate in politics and/or enter the corridors of power. However, in this the army had the crucial support and/or collusion of significant sections of the civilian bureaucracy, judiciary, and other state machineries, as well as most politicians and religious factotums.

Because of the ever-tightening authoritarian grip, resistance politics simmered. The discontent however surfaced in the mid to late 1960s, also fuelled by global and regional sociopolitical developments at the time. There was political agitation and the army dictator who had ruled Pakistan for 11 years (1958-1969) was compelled to resign. He handed over power to another army General, under whose watch the country broke up in 1971 when East Pakistan seceded to become Bangladesh. No lessons were learned from that. Instead there was a doubling down on the official political narrative, which was imposed with even greater vengeance in the remaining Pakistan, reaching its zenith during the third 11-year (July 1977-August 1988) army dictatorship. Although there was a façade of civilian political governments from 1988 to 1999, the official narrative and associated political order continued to prevail.

The political, pragmatic, and ideational fallouts of the official narrative have been consequential and largely counterproductive. While recognising the risk of overburdening the concept, one notes that the official narrative is enmeshed with the following: (1) It became the core of the ‘Ideology of Pakistan’, which was as vague and abstract as the Two-Nation theory (reference to that ideology however slowly tapered off and direct reference to it is now almost non-existent). (2) The army top brass and right-wing Islamist parties arrogated themselves the power to be the guardians and arbiters of the official narrative and the so-called Ideology of Pakistan. (3) There were numerous constitutional amendments and laws that incorporated the official narrative. (4) There was legislation that made it compulsory that curricula of arts, humanities and social sciences are infused with the official narrative and distorted history. The compulsory components were initially introduced in the earlier classes, but over time extended up to undergraduate studies, which continues. (5) There was a mushrooming of madrassahs (religious seminaries), most of which produced mainly zealots. (6) Freedom of thought, expression, and engagement in alternative politics were curtailed. The space for critical examination of the official narrative and the political order was progressively shrunk, and those who crossed the boundaries were demonised as anti-state and/or anti-Islam, or incarcerated, or ‘disappeared’, or physically eliminated. (7) The psychosocial malignancies of authoritarianism, intolerance, militaristic thinking, lies and hypocrisy, and most importantly degraded critical thinking were nurtured. All of which in turn contributed to the erosion of the moral basis of society and societal fracture. (8) It spawned widespread, and many times violent, religious and sectarian strife. (9) Rights and privileges were proportionate to the apparent level of loyalty or adherence to the official narrative and their purveyors. (10) It was used as a justification for, and glorification of, mercenary services in the garb of ‘Jihad’ or the subsequent ‘war against terror’ in Afghanistan. (11) Most politicians and political parties jostled to be ‘more loyal to the king (army) and the official narrative than thou’, which the army top brass umpired. Many adopted this (more loyal than the king) approach for advantage or to avoid punishment. (12) The official narrative became sacrosanct and subverted democratic political processes and citizens’ rights. So, when held, elections were rigged, and democracy became a farce.

Challenges to the official narrative and the associated political order and evolution of an alternative narrative have a long and complicated history. But in this essay they are picked up from the period starting October 1999, when yet another army rule was imposed. In an ironic twist, the then army dictator came up with the notion of ‘enlightened moderation’, which somewhat diluted the sharp edges of the Islamic, but not the (military) security, thrust of the official narrative. Pragmatically it was reflected in allowing private TV channels to operate in Pakistan and an overall environment of greater freedom of speech. Reforms in certain other areas were undertaken, the most important one being in the political arena, where, though flawed in certain significant aspects, a local government system was introduced and implemented in 2002, which aimed to devolve (political) power to the grassroots. Being birthed and spearheaded by the army, many conveniently toed the reform agenda, at least in words. But there was pushback after 2002, and more so after 2007/8. So, enlightened moderation withered away, intellectual space shrank, the empowering local government system was mangled or dismantled, and the official narrative and associated political order was reasserted.

Though it did not directly challenge the official narrative or the status quo, in the late 20th century, corruption in politics and governance started being highlighted as a major theme in the political narrative, which gained some traction. However, it did not pose a serious challenge and was either ignored or laughingly dismissed. And in realpolitik the tilt remained strongly in favour of the status quo forces and continuation of their firm grip on power and almost limitless benefits and advantages without accountability of the few. But the appeal of the anti-corruption embellishment slowly gained strength, initially amongst educated and tech-savvy urban youth, including women, but later in more and more sections of society. And in the elections of 2018, the old political forces and actors created and supported by state machineries, especially the army, were defeated (in a once again controversial election – Ed.) and the challenging party was ‘allowed’ to form the government in the Centre as well as in two of the four provinces. However, although ostensibly a somewhat different political order came into place, the political narrative and the rules and practices of politics and governance remained largely unchanged. The anti-corruption narrative, policies and actions of the new order were nevertheless threatening to the interests of the entrenched cabal. So, the narrative that the government was incompetent, corrupt, and outright dangerous for Pakistan was widely propagated (according to critics when the establishment, accused of bringing these ‘fresh’ faces into power, fell out with them – Ed.). And a battle over political power and narrative gained momentum, reaching its peak in April 2022, when the champions of the old political order regained power.

Surprisingly, large numbers came out on the street to protest the change, likely more due to abhorrence of the old corrupt and incompetent political actors than love for the ones removed from power. As the battle of political narratives and politics unfolded, the differences between them became increasingly clearer and sharper. However, this clarity emerged in an entwined fashion, sort of in an action and reaction fashion. As the challenge gained traction, the existing power-wielders tried to beat it back through unconstitutional steps, brutal oppression (cooked up charges, incarceration, disappearances, and attempted and outright murder). But instead of caving in, the challenge responded adaptively to state actions and continued refining and honing its narrative. The oppressive actions devoid of morality and beyond law correspondingly increased. In the process not only did the differences between the two become clearer, the appeal of the alternative also increased, which was provided fodder by the state’s brazenly oppressive and immoral actions, which were many, and picked gleefully and widely disseminated through social and other media.

Most purveyors and supporters of the official narrative and the status quo are not amenable to, and/or incapable of, critical self-examination and learning. Instead of learning from their past mistakes that caused huge societal, political and moral damage, they keep upping the ante and damage being now wrought is far more consequential. Nevertheless, despite their decisions and actions, or more likely because of them, the appeal of the official narrative and its associated political order has shrunk significantly, perhaps been eliminated, except amongst those who are direct beneficiaries. Further, some significant individuals of state machineries, as well as past political beneficiaries, have also started raising questions and challenging the official narrative and the prevailing order.

Currently, in the political sphere the existing order is hanging on by the skin of its teeth as the alternative narrative threatens the existing political order. So, the suppression ante keeps being upped, which further exposes the immoral foundations of the existing order and strengthens the challenge, and the cycle of escalation continues. There also were enticements that the oppression of those who shifted their allegiance to the status quo political forces would end and they could be given official status or position with associated unaccountable benefits. But this is often being called-out and there is shaming, which further strengthens the supporters of the challenge.

The landscape of the face-off reveals that politics, civilian governments, parliaments, courts, the election commission, and all other state machineries are controlled by a coterie of army Generals, led by the army chief and some senior officials of the intelligence agencies; the autocratic agenda of power-concentration and status quo maintenance is implemented by underlings of state machineries on the orders of their masters, but with the (unbelieved) fig-leaf that the masters are not involved; there is no accountability of the decisions and orders of the masters, or flowing from those the actions of the underlings, who violate the Constitution and laws, brutalise people, and indulge in human rights abuses; most of the thousands who have been brutalised, oppressed and punished are innocent, have minimal to zero legal redress available, and are often also victim-blamed and punished further; those standing with the alternative are not allowed any political activity.

The ongoing struggle is ultimately over individual autonomy and agency, which is linked to political liberation. The existing order is premised on exclusion, disempowerment, and homogeneity, which is enacted through disciplinary power. In counter-position, the alternative has given rise to a growing public realisation that individuals have autonomy and agency, and the right and responsibility to make moral judgements and take political positions, and as well resist disciplinary power. The latter has in turn made possible connectivity with others. That is, when autonomous agents act politically, a community solidarity emerges, which is not only a community of the living, but also of the dead, and those who are yet to be born, and as well beyond the boundary limits of the country. Further, the realisation of the autonomous self and connectivity with others has generated commitment to a shared struggle for a more moral and just order through active politics. And therein lies the real danger to the existing order.

The struggle also shines a light on the truism that positive progress is possible only if one learns from past mistakes or negative experiences. There are good indications that the majority are learning by recognising the damage of past as well as current mistakes, which is combined with their cognisance of the illegitimacy and immorality of the current moral and political order. And for many this has translated into political positions or actions. However, while the overall arc is positive, it is also true that improvement in the lives of most people is bound to be a long and hard struggle, with many slips. While it is certain that maintaining the status quo is no more an option or a possibility, it is uncertain how well or not so well the process of positive change will unfold in the context of widespread moral and intellectual degradation, the stranglehold of the forces of evil, and the many pragmatic difficulties and hurdles that the disempowered and wretched must contend with in their daily lives.